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ABSTRACT 
MORAL IMAGINATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
by 
Peter L. Samuelson 
 
A review of the literature in several domains reveals that moral imagination plays 
a role in how we deliberate about moral issues and what motivates us to act in a moral 
way.  This study begins by outlining an operational definition of moral imagination based 
largely on Dewey’s model of dramatic rehearsal (Dewey, 1922), along with an 
explication of the role of image schemas, metaphor, empathy, and narrative in moral 
imagination (Johnson, 1993) and an examination of how moral imagination develops 
through the lifespan.  A review of the research of the components of moral imagination is 
included, especially in the literature of moral development, problem solving, and 
creativity, as well as a proposal of an avenue of research to advance the understanding of 
this vital and complex human capacity.  The study continues with an investigation of a 
curriculum designed to foster the cognitive processing of empathic emotions stimulated 
by viewing film clips from Hollywood-produced films. The curriculum stimulates moral 
imagination by offering situations in which participants can place themselves and then 
discuss possible moral outcomes.  The curriculum is thought to aid in the development of 
moral expertise by exposing participants to a perspective-taking script from childhood 
(Hoffman, 2000) and making that script chronically accessible to the participant (Lapsley 
& Narvaez, in press).  Three hundred sixty-six students (grades third through eighth) 
enrolled in after-school programs in two rural Georgia counties were randomly assigned 
to either an intervention or control group.  The content of the intervention was delivered 
in a 3-week period in one county and in a 9-week period in the other.  Results indicate 
that the longer intervention produced more gains in moral theme recognition (MTI; 
Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999) compared to the shorter intervention.  
Participants in the shorter intervention demonstrated an attraction to moral theme 
statements reflecting higher stages of moral reasoning after the intervention than before 
compared to a control group from the same county.   While further study is warranted, it 
appears the curriculum initiated a transition to higher stage reasoning in some of the 
participants.  
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CHAPTER 1 
CONCIEVING MORAL IMAGINATION: ITS DEFINITION AND ASSESSEMENT 
Introduction 
“Imagination is the chief instrument of the good” (Dewey quoting Shelley, 1934/1980). 
The idea of moral imagination has within it an inherent definitional tension--a 
paradox.  For where the moral has to do with the common good, imagination strives for 
the uncommon.  Where the moral has to do with societal relations, imagination is 
inherently individualistic.  Where the moral is based on laws and conventions, the 
conventional is the very antithesis of the imaginative (Runco, 1993).  For example, 
Kohlberg’s famous moral development theory defines morality in terms of 
conventionality, parsing moral reasoning into pre-conventional, conventional, and post-
conventional stages (Kohlberg, 1981).  Yet, in spite of these tensions, many moral and 
educational philosophers of the past century (Bruner,1986; Dewey; 1934/1980; 
Egan,1997; Fesmire,1994; Greene,1995; Haste,1993; Johnson,1993; Kekes,1995; Lakoff 
& Johnson,1999; Tivnan,1995; Vygostky cited in Ayman-Nolley,1992; Zaw,1996) as 
well as numerous psychologist (Gruber,1993; Kudriavtsev, 2001; Modell, 2003; 
Mouchiroud & Lubart, T., 2002; Paradales, 2002; Runco, 2003) consider imagination to 
be an integral part of moral deliberation and moral action.  Many of them see limitations 
in the conventional approach to morality and ethics with its focus on rights and duties,  
1 
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and look to imagination to help us solve our most pressing and vexing moral problems 
(for a thorough discussion see Fesmire, 1994; Johnson, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).    
This paper is an investigation of the concept of moral imagination.  This search 
will examine not only to the literature of psychology and education, but also philosophy 
and linguistics, for a search to define moral imagination brings us to the very heart of 
cognition and volition, how we deliberate about moral issues and what motivates us to act 
in a moral way.  This paper will offer an operational definition of moral imagination 
based largely on Dewey’s model of dramatic rehearsal (Dewey, 1922; Fesmire, 2003) and 
explicate the role of image schemas, metaphor, empathy, and narrative in moral 
imagination, including an examination into how moral imagination develops through the 
lifespan.  Since there is little direct investigation of moral imagination in the literature, a 
review of the research of the components of moral imagination is necessary, especially in 
the literature of moral development, problem solving, and creativity.  Finally, the paper 
includes an avenue of research to advance our understanding of this vital and complex 
human capacity.  
A Definition of Moral Imagination 
 Both moral and imagination are complex and multifaceted terms that defy neat 
description or definition. The approach of this paper will be to first define imagination 
and then apply it to the moral realm.  Imagination is a capacity of human thought (Singer, 
1999), which, like reason, can be applied to many domains of human experience, 
including the moral domain (Johnson,1993; Modell, 2003).  It can be defined as simply 
as the connection of unlikely elements (Wheeler-Brownlee,1985), or as comprehensively  
3 
as “the ability to see the whole before the parts” (Kudriavtsev, 2001, p.19).  Singer 
(1999) takes an approach commonly found in the literature, which focuses on the making 
of a mental “image.”   He defines imagination as the ability of the individual to 
reproduce, in the consciousness, “images or concepts originally derived from the senses” 
(p. 13).  These images can then be reformed or combined in new forms or new images as 
the basis for future actions or works.  Imagination also can be aural, involving verbal 
sequences or “story–like forms” (p. 14). 
 Imagination goes beyond mere reproduction or even re-combinations of sensory 
experience.  Maxine Greene (1995) based her approach to the role of imagination in 
learning on John Dewey’s understanding of imagination as “an ability to look at things as 
if they could be otherwise” (p. 20).  But more than this, she writes,  
“as John Dewey saw it, imagination is the ‘gateway through which meanings 
derived from past experience find their way into the present’; is the ‘the conscious 
adjustment of the new and the old’….. Consciousness always has an imaginative 
phase, and imagination, more than any other capacity, breaks through the inertia 
of habit” (p. 20).   
 
Theodore Sarbin (1998) thought there is much to learn from the pre-Cartisian 
understanding of the 16th century in which imagination denoted imitating or copying, in 
three-dimensional form, something from the world.  An imaginer, in the pre-Renaissance 
sense was an image-maker or a doer.  Only at the advent of the Cartisian duality of mind 
and body did imagination become a private, silent action.  Sarbin defines imaginings as 
“actions that serve human intentions and purposes.. (that) refer to the doings of people 
rather than happenings in the mind”  (p. 17).  He prefers the term hypothetical 
instantiation.  “Instantiation means to represent an abstraction by a concrete instance…  
4 
Hypothetical instantiation refers specifically to the act of instantiating absent objects and 
events” (p. 20).  Sarbin posits a three stage development of this skill: 1) Imitation: 
copying out loud the actions of someone or something that can be seen and heard, 2) role-
taking: copying out loud a model when that model is no longer in sight and, 3) Imagining, 
i.e. role-taking in muted and storied form, as an “active, constructive copying of absent 
models (where) the products of such constructional activity are narratives” (p. 21). 
 Mark Johnson (1993) would agree with Sarbin’s (1998) definition that 
imagination involves “the active construction of absent models.”  He would combine it 
with Singer’s insight that imagination involves sense derived images or concepts.  For 
Johnson and others who draw their insights from cognitive science, imagination is based 
on bodily and sensorimotor experiences such as uprightness (standing), balance 
(equilibrium), motion, (travel, destination), momentum, possession of objects (Fesmire, 
1994; Gibbs & Colston,1995; Lakoff & Johnson,1999; Modell, 2003).  These bodily 
experiences become conceptual, foundational metaphors for thinking.  “Reason is 
imaginative in that bodily inference forms are mapped onto abstract modes of inference 
by metaphor” (Lakoff & Johnson,1999, p. 77).  Thus the notion of uprightness in moral 
behavior is based on sensation of standing erect.  The notion of balance in justice is 
based on the sensation of equilibrium in the body.  The notion of walking a righteous 
path is based on the experience of moving from point a to point b with the object of 
reaching a destination (source-path-goal).  Metaphor is the link between conscious 
experience and unconscious memory (Modell, 2003).  Imagination is the metaphorical  
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projection of bodily experiences (embodied concepts) unto abstract concepts such as 
peace, justice, morality, and social harmony (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).   
From these various ideas, we can begin to fashion a definition of imagination.  
Imagination is the capacity to represent absent objects, constructs, events or experiences  
in a hypothetical fashion using concrete experiences of bodily sensations and 
sensorimotor perceptions as the basis for these representations.  The abstraction from 
concrete experience is a metaphorical process in which the concepts derived from bodily 
sensation and sensorimotor experience guide the formation of and reasoning about the 
abstraction.  Kieran Egan (1999) defines imagination simply as “our capacity to think of 
things as possibly being so” (p. 167). 
What makes imagination moral?   
      Imagination becomes moral when it is utilized for the well being of others.  
Notions of justice, peace, equity, fairness essentially involve the well being of individuals 
embedded in social relationships of varying complexity--from intimate dyads to families, 
to volunteer associations to communal arrangements to societal systems to pan-global 
responsibilities.  Since morality has to do with interaction with an “other” in various 
levels of complexity and number, moral imagination will necessarily take into account 
the perspective of the other in as complete a manner as possible.  Moral imagination 
would involve at least the ability to abstract the feelings, thoughts, goals, and intentions 
of the “other” based on a person’s own concrete experiences (Falkenberg, 2003; 
Paradales, 2002).  Mark Johnson (1993) in his book Moral Imagination states: 
Imagination is the means for going beyond our selves as presently formed, moving 
transformatively toward imagined ideals of what we might become… moral  
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imagination is our capacity to see and to realize in some actual or contemplated 
experience possibilities for enhancing the quality of experience both for ourselves and 
the communities of which we are a part. (p. 209) 
     
and also:  
Imagination is the means by which we are able to conceive of alternative 
perspectives and to explore their implications for action, relationships, and 
communal well-being.  Thus, the very possibility of taking a critical stance toward 
a particular viewpoint depends on our imaginative ability to envision other 
viewpoints (p. 209).   
 
Therefore, moral imagination involves perspective taking and empathy, but it is 
more than just these skills.  It involves the use of the imagination for empathic 
perspective taking, and, in turn, taking that information to imaginatively project 
(hypothetically instantiate) the possible choices available and outcomes that might 
emerge given the various personalities and contingencies at work.   
This is what Sarbin (1998) labeled the constructional activity of imagination.  In 
the pre-Renaissance, imagination was the process of imitating or copying reality by 
making a three-dimensional representation.  In the definition argued for here, moral 
imagination is also a making of something.  It is the construction of a narrative of action 
which takes the perceived “realities” of the situation--the personalities and personal 
character of the people involved and the kinds of actions and choices they have made in 
the past, their current circumstances, the forces that constrain them, and the choices 
available to them--and fashions from this situation one or several hypothetical courses of 
action one of which can be enacted.  In this deliberation one has all the elements of a 
narrative: a plot (the presenting problem), a setting (the constraining circumstances),  
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characters (discerned through empathic imagination), moving through time toward an 
end.   
Dewey (1922) called this deliberative process dramatic rehearsal.  Steven 
Fesmire (1994) describes this process in his book Dramatic Rehearsal and the Moral 
Artist:  A Deweyan Theory of Moral Understanding.  He writes that for Dewey, dramatic 
rehearsal was appropriate for any kind of scientific, aesthetic, or moral situation in which 
there exist competing desires or values or one in which there is doubt.  In the process of 
deliberation we “try on” various possibilities for action.  When the imagined outcome is 
“felt to cohere with our prefigured experience and with our expectations of the future” the 
deliberative process is culminated and resolved (p. 2).  The resolution comes from a 
“feeling” of the “fit” of the projected action.   
What makes dramatic rehearsal possible, according to Dewey, is our capacity for 
imagination. This imagination takes the form of a dramatic rehearsal of events in our 
minds. Fesmire (1994) writes: 
Imagination, like drama, is story-structured, and is spurred by conflicts and 
contrasts among characters and contingent events.  It is vivid and emotionally 
moving and brings competing tendencies and instabilities to resolution.” (p. 3).   
 
From How We Think, Dewey (1998) writes 
[Deliberation] is a vicarious, anticipatory way of acting, a kind of dramatic 
rehearsal.  Were there only one suggestion popping up, we should undoubtedly 
adopt it at once.  But where there are two or more, they collide with one another, 
maintain a state of suspense and produce further inquiry (p. 139). 
 
And from Ethics (Dewey, 1998):   
Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct.  
We give way in our mind, to some impulse, we try in our mind some plan.   
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Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves, in imagination, in 
the presence of the consequences that would follow.  And as we then like and 
approve, or dislike and approve, these consequences, we find the original plan 
good or bad (p. 335). 
 
And finally, from Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey (1922) says: 
 
Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing 
possible lines of action…. Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the 
various lines of possible action are really like…. thoughts run ahead and foresee  
outcomes, and thereby avoid having to await the instruction of actual failure and 
disaster  (p. 190). 
 
 When deliberation such as Dewey describes occurs over moral issues--when 
people engage in “active construction of absent models” (Sarbin,1998) to solve moral 
dilemmas--they are engaging moral imagination. Moral Imagination in this Deweyan 
sense is “the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what it could 
be” (Fesmire, 2003, p. 65).  This type of activity has a decidedly narrative structure as we 
attempt to plot a course of action taking into account the various elements that affect our 
moral decisions.  We take our previous experience and understanding of the way things 
ought to go together with our understanding of the characters involved, their 
circumstances and setting, and play out various courses of action and their consequences 
in order to prove the best choice for moral action. This method of deliberation (Johnson, 
1985), I define as moral imagination. 
The four components of moral imagination 
 In order to adequately utilize our moral imagination as described above, four 
skills or cognitive tools must be in place:  (a) the image and experiential schemas 
activated through our deliberation (previous experience);  (b) The way we reason about 
moral issues through conceptual metaphors  (understanding of the way things ought to 
9 
go) (c)  An ability to take the perspective of others and empathize with them 
(understanding character); and (d) An ability to frame the circumstances of the people 
and the moral issues involved (setting ). This model posits four components of moral 
Imagination: schemas, metaphors, empathy, and framing (Johnson, 1993; Modell, 2003;  
Zaw,1996). 
 These four components are similar to what Mark Johnson describes as the four 
elements of moral imagination (Johnson, 1993).  He says moral imagination is composed 
of: 1) the prototype structure of concepts 2) the framing of situations 3) metaphor and 4) 
narrative.  Where this model differs from Johnson is with the elements of empathy and 
narrative.  Rather than viewing narrative as an element of moral imagination, it is viewed 
as constitutive of moral imagination.  It is not a part of moral imagination it is the whole.  
Moral imagination, as is argued above, is a narrative enterprise--a hypothetical 
instantiation (Sarbin, 1998)--a dramatic rehearsal (Dewey, 1922).  While Johnson views 
narrative as one of four elements in moral imagination, his description betrays a more 
comprehensive view, for he states: 
Narrative makes it possible for us not only to explore the consequences of 
decisions and commitments over an extended period of time, but also to reflect on 
the concrete particularities that make up the fine texture of our actual moral  
experience.  It invites us to develop our perception of character, of what is 
important in a given situation and of the subtly interwoven threads of our moral 
entanglements. ….The power of fictional narrative to develop our moral 
sensitivity, our ability to make subtle discriminations and our empathy for others, 
is thus the result of the narrative structure of our lives… Narrative explorations of 
this sort are, in fact, what moral reasoning is all about (Johnson, 1993, p. 196-7, 
original emphasis). 
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Another difference between Johnson’s understanding of moral imagination and 
the one presented here is in the conception of the role of empathy.  What is usually called 
empathy in the psychological literature (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), he labels empathic 
 imagination.  For Johnson empathy is a form of moral imagination--a method of moral 
reasoning (see also Kekes, 1995; Tivnan, 1995).  “Reflecting in this way  [through 
empathic imagination] involves an imaginative rationality through which we can 
participate empathically in another’s experience….Morally sensitive people are capable 
of living out, in and through such experiential imagination, the reality of others with 
whom they are interacting, or whom their actions might affect” (Johnson, 1993, p. 200).  
Therefore, what Johnson calls empathic imagination, is more properly labeled moral 
imagination.  For example, he equates the activity of “taking up the place of the other” 
with the term “dramatic rehearsal” (p. 200).  Johnson’s concern is to give empathy an  
exalted place in moral reasoning to counter the traditional separation of feeling from 
reason in the moral philosophy of Kant and Rawls (Johnson, 1985, 1993).  In this paper it 
is viewed, rather, as a critical element or component of moral imagination – a part of  
moral imagination rather than a form of moral imagination.  Therefore, empathy, along 
with personal experience (in the form of image and prototypical schemas) and metaphor, 
are the constitutive elements of the narrative enterprise called moral imagination. 
 What follows is a description from the literature of the four components of moral 
imagination in this order:  experiential schemas, framing, empathy, and metaphor.  Each 
description will include a definition, how the concept is measured, its correlates, and how 
the capacity develops through the lifespan. 
11 
Experiential Schemas. There are two types of schemas that need to be defined and 
distinguished.  The first is image schemas which are defined as “organizing structures of 
experience at the level of bodily perception and movement (Gibbs & Colston, 1995, p. 
349) and the second I call experiential schemas which can be made up of image schema 
but represent more complex behavioral patterns in memory and cognition. (May, 
Friedman, & Clark, 1996; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). 
Of the two types, image schemas are more particular and less well known.  
Defined as “dynamic analog representations [derived from perceptual and motor 
processes] of spatial relations and movements in space,” (Gibbs, 1997), they are most 
widely talked about in cognitive linguistics where scientists have noticed how language 
across domains has similar concepts grounded in our bodily experiences and actions, our 
perceptual interactions, and the way we manipulate objects (Gibbs & Colston, 1995).   
As we grow and learn about the world through manipulating objects, by orienting 
ourselves in space and time and directing the focus of our perception, we form image 
schemas which become foundational concepts for thinking and reasoning (Gibbs & 
Colston, 1995).  For example, Gibbs (1997) reported the results of his analysis of the 
various uses of the word “stand” across domains (interpersonal relations, law, science, 
politics).  He was able to reduce the meanings to 5 perceptual bodily experiences 
(balance, verticality, center-periphery, resistance and linkage).  The meaning of the word 
depends on which bodily/spatial experience dominates.  These image schemas then 
become the basis for the conceptual metaphors we use to think about our experience (for 
instance, “love is a journey,” Gibbs, 1997).  Image schemas are not tied to any one  
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perceptual modality.  They are more abstract than mere images and rely more on spatial 
patterns and dynamic interaction in movement and spatial relations.  Gibbs (1995) has 
identified over two dozen image schemas that appear in our thinking, reasoning, and 
imagining on a regular basis. 
Experiential schemas, on the other hand can include but are not limited to image 
schemas. Rest et al. (1999) define a schema as “a general knowledge structure, residing 
in long-term memory that is invoked (or activated) by current stimulus configurations 
that resemble previous stimuli” (p. 136).  Schemas come to play when we encounter new 
information and apply our organized generic prior knowledge to the understanding of it.  
They operate like hypotheses or presuppositions about the way the world works and help 
focus attention and give structure to experience through expectations and preconceptions.  
Sometimes called prototypes they are a kind of average (the statistical central tendency) 
of all similar experiences (May et al., 1996). 
 Schemas work by a process similar to Piaget's notion of assimilation.  A schema 
has slots that can be filled in by particular experiences.  If the slots are not filled in by the 
experience at hand, then a schema supplies the information.  What schemas do is to 
enable us to identify the parameters of experience quickly; chunk the experience into an 
appropriate unit; fill in missing information and provide guidance for obtaining further 
information, solving a problem, or reaching a goal (Rest et al., 1999).  Cognitive schemas 
theorists (CST) have identified a hierarchy of schemas from the most simplistic, like 
memory objects (things related by characteristics) to cognitive fields (a set of memory  
objects activated by an experience) to mental models (the overall meaning structure of a  
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given experience) (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). The central idea is that knowledge is stored 
in a related and connected way, which enables us to adapt to our environment more 
quickly by guiding our perceptions and learning. 
In the moral realm, image schemas have their greatest impact in how they guide 
thinking about moral issues through metaphor.  For example, the bodily experience of 
balance and equilibrium guides our thinking about equity and fair distribution of wealth 
(Johnson, 1985).  The more general, cognitive schemas (CST) also affect our moral 
reasoning.  By helping us anticipate the issues of any given moral situation, we are able 
to process our thoughts more quickly.  By the same token they can work against moral 
imagination by constraining our thought patterns to the schema.  
Rest et al. (1999) use cognitive schema theory (CST) to explain the development 
of moral reasoning originally posited by Kohlberg and measured by Rest’s Defining 
Issues Test (DIT).  They claim that those who exhibit the complex moral judgments of 
Kohlberg’s post-conventional moral reasoning stage “have a larger, better organized set 
of memory objects that can be activated within multiple cognitive fields and form part of 
complex mental models” (Narvaez & Bock, 2002).  Narveaz (1998) tested this hypothesis 
with a group of eighth graders and college students.  After reading four texts in 
succession in which moral stage schemas (1-5) were embedded, the students were asked 
to recall the general content of the story.  Results show that those with higher moral 
judgment scores (DIT), reconstructed significantly more stage 5 reasoning than did those 
with lower scores.  Moreover, college students recalled significantly more stage 5 than 
stage 1-4 moral arguments than the eighth graders.  Narveaz (1998) also reports that  
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students inferred reasoning not present in the stories, suggesting that the prior knowledge 
of moral schemas influenced the recall of stories. 
The research in image schema and cognitive schema theory establish that humans 
bring highly structured prior knowledge to the process of moral deliberation and our use 
of moral imagination.  These structures are a part of the raw material that goes into the 
narrative instantiation process as we imagine possible courses of action in our 
imagination.  Image schemas give us metaphors and ways to think about moral situations.  
Cognitive schemas give us “packaged” experiences that guide the construction of 
possible outcomes in our imagination.  Both image and cognitive schemas grow over 
time in two significant way: (a) as we gain more life experience we have more schemas 
available (more image schemas, more memory objects which build more cognitive fields 
and mental models) and (b) as we use these schemas in moral deliberation we become 
more proficient with them and make more connections among schemas.  Thus we would 
expect that the capacity for moral imagination would likewise have a developmental 
trajectory and grow over time. 
Framing moral situations.  Johnson (1993) states: “the situations in which we find 
ourselves and in which we must decide how to act do not come with their one and only 
proper descriptions attached, we must conceptualize them in a certain way”  (p. 192).  
The way we conceptualize them is called framing.  The way we frame experience will 
determine if we consider a situation a moral dilemma or not.  For example, it takes a 
particular view of gender roles, for a woman to see as unfair the need to constantly pick 
up after her husband , even if that view is widely shared (Colby, 2000).  As far back as  
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1948, Solomon Asch proved that the very meaning of a message changes as a function of 
the source to which it is attributed (Ross, 1990).  The source attribution frames the 
interpretation of the message.  For example, an identical arms reduction proposal was less 
well received by American students when attributed to M. Gorbachev, the Russian 
President at the time of the study than when attributed to R. Regan, the American 
President.  The framing of a situation will determine, in part, our reaction to it.  It appears 
that if an issue is framed as an ethical issue, highlighting the ethical implications, it 
engenders a different response than if that same issue is framed as a material issue. In 
making a decision about a political candidate, students who received information on that 
candidate in an ethical textual frame were significantly more likely to refuse to make 
compensations for issues that conflicted with their view on that issue than those who 
were presented the information in a material frame (Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996).  
The same effect on subsequent decisions holds when individuals frame the 
situation for themselves.  Rothman and Salovey  (1997), expanding on the famous 
framing effect of the 1981 experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (in which people chose  
different options depending on whether the identical information was framed as a gain or 
a loss), found that people will act on health information only if the recommended 
behavior matches their adopted framing of the issue (gain-framed or loss-framed).  
Moreover, it appears that the influence of the framing of a situation holds for both 
hypothetical and real decisions (Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002).  This 
and other research indicates that framing has a strong influence on decisions.  One way to 
overcome the constraints of framing is to encourage multiple construals of a situation.   
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Griffin, Dunning, and Ross (1990) found that participants in their study stuck to the 
confident predictions they inferred from their initial assessment of a situation even when 
they were told their inference may be wrong.  Only those who were specifically asked to 
make multiple construals of the situation after their initial assessment, showed a lower 
confidence in their initial assessment.  This study shows both the power of the initial 
framing of a situation and the potential remedy of imagination (multiple construals) to 
find creative solutions to entrenched moral problems. 
Framing depends on experience.  If we grant that experience is available to us 
through schemas then schemas will influence the way situations are framed (Johnson, 
1993).  The need to frame situations is constant in our development.  Therefore, the 
ability to frame of situation does not seem to change much over time.  Individual 
differences in framing ability come from the variety of experience that each person has.  
However, the ability to imagine multiple construals of a situation would, at least, 
hypothetically change over time.  The more experiences one has allows for greater 
possibilities for framing situations in multiple ways. 
 Empathy.  Empathy is, by its very definition, an imaginative construct.  Maxine 
Greene (1995) put it this way: “imagination is what makes empathy possible”  (p. 3). 
Indeed, empirical studies show a positive relationship between imagination and empathy 
(Rabinowitz & Heinhorn, 1984-85).  This is because empathy involves sharing another’s 
cognitive and emotional state (Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1998; 
Roberts & Strayer, 1996).  Since one can only directly experience one’s thoughts and 
emotions, one must use imagination to experience the thoughts and emotions of others.  
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Even as far back as Hume, what we call empathy (and he called “sympathy’ or “sharing 
the concern of others”) was viewed as central to moral deliberation (Johnson, 1993).   
Coined in the early 1900’s by Titchner, the term is a translation of einfuhlung, used by 
German aesthetic philosophers to denote feeling “into” another’s experience (from the 
Greek em = in; pathos = feeling or suffering) as opposed to sympathy, which is feeling 
with someone (sym = with; pathos = feeling or suffering) (Wispe, 1987).  Eisenberg and 
Miller (1987) offer this classic definition: 
Empathy is an affective state stemming from apprehensions of another’s 
emotional state or condition and which is congruent with it (p. 292). 
 
The apprehension of another’s state is a complex phenomenon but certainly it involves 
imagination (Strayer, 1987). 
 From a summary reading of the literature, empathy involves three salient features:  
emotional response, emotional insight, and perspective/role taking.  Janet Strayer (1987) 
calls emotional response the “sine qua non of empathy” (p. 226).  Some researchers make 
a distinction in the emotional responses related to empathy between sympathy and  
personal distress, depending on whether the response is other focused (sympathy) or self-
focused (personal distress) (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998; Hoffman, 1998).  
Emotional insight involves insight into one’s own as well as another’s emotions.  Roberts 
and Strayer (1996) have shown that a child’s insight into his or her own emotion is 
positively related to empathy.  Also, training in the recognition of both verbal and non-
verbal emotional cues along with labeling those emotions will increase empathy 
(Eisenberg, Wentzel & Harris, 1998; Feshbach, 1989).  Finally, all the most prevalent 
models and definitions of empathy include perspective/role taking, commonly defined as  
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the cognitive (Roberts & Strayer,1996).  Role taking is recognized by many moral 
theorists as a critical skill in moral reasoning (Colby, 2000; Johnson, 1996;  Kekes, 1995; 
Modell, 2003; Tivnan, 1995).  
 Empathy has a distinct developmental path.  Longitudinal and cross sectional 
studies show a growth in empathy over time (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & 
Shea, 1991; Hoffman, 1998; Roberts & Strayer, 1996).  The main growth is in the 
cognitive side of empathy, that is, the perspective and role taking skills.  Children also 
gain more awareness and mastery over their emotions, contributing to increased empathy 
(Roberts & Strayer, 1996).  The cognitive function of perspective taking is often labeled 
as a work of the imagination (Upright, 2002).  Recent work involving PET scans of 
subjects who were asked to take a third-person perspective shows that similar regions of 
the brain that are activated while in first person perspective are also activated while 
taking a third-person perspective.  The differences seem to be in the areas associated with 
self-consciousness. (Ruby & Decety, 2001).  These findings are consistent with 
developmental theories that posit the acquisition of a self-other distinction as critical to 
the growth of empathy in children (Hoffman, 1998;  Strayer, 1993).   
 Metaphor. Arnold Modell (2003) would take this last point in our discussion of 
empathy as concrete evidence of the metaphorical nature of empathy.  In his book 
Imagination and the Meaningful Brain, he states:   
Empathic imagination… relies on metaphor, for within an empathic connection 
there is a play of similarity and different based on metaphor.  Empathy requires 
this play of similarity and difference:  one recognizes a sense of identity with the 
other while at the same time retaining one’s sense of self “ (p. 118).   
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Samuel Johnson said in metaphor there are “two ideas in one” (Kittay, 1997).  In the case 
of empathy, personal experience becomes the vehicle for the experience of the other. 
When Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and other cognitive linguists speak of metaphor, 
they mean more than just a creative use of language.  They mean that certain bodily 
experiences of space, time, and objects become the basis for understanding other 
experiences.  These metaphors are called conceptual metaphors.  “Metaphors allow 
conventional mental imagery from sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of 
subjective experience” (p. 45).  These conceptual metaphors are pervasive and operate 
largely unconsciously.  These metaphors are acquired automatically over time, from 
merely experiencing the world in ordinary ways.  Lakoff and Johnson’s claim is this:  
“we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors” (p. 47).  Here is a list of 
some of these metaphors:  Affection is Warmth; Important is Big; Intimacy is Closeness;  
More is Up; Similarity is Closeness; Help is Support; Time is Motion; States are  
Locations; Causes are Physical Forces; Knowing is Seeing; Understanding is Grasping 
(pp. 50-54).  From these examples we see that the sensorimotor experience becomes the 
vehicle to understand the subjective experience.   
 The way linguistic metaphors operate can helps us to grasp how conceptual 
metaphors work.  Gentner and Wolff (2000) suggest that metaphors work because of the 
matching of structured relations as opposed to a mere list of shared independent features.  
In previous studies, they demonstrated that people prefer to match predicates belonging 
to interconnected systems of knowledge and not just independent components.  In a meta-
analysis of the persuasive effects of metaphors, Sopory and Dillard (2002) found that the  
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one view that explained most of the supported hypothesis of the studies involved was the 
superior organization view, which states that metaphors facilitate selection and 
integration of information from the message and prior knowledge.  When metaphors were 
placed at the beginning of a message and were extended, they were most persuasive.  
This supports the notion that metaphors facilitate the connection of concepts.  Those 
concepts that are closely matched in our experience make metaphor comprehension 
easier.  Subjects had more difficulty with metaphors in which the vehicle and target were 
semantically disparate than when they were semantically related. (Kintsch & Bowles, 
2002).     
The key to the operation of metaphors is that they help us understand something 
in terms of something else.  In the case of empathy, we understand another’s feelings in 
terms of our own.  In the case of conceptual metaphors, we understand things in terms of 
basic sensorimotor experience.  Cognition is characterized by connectivity--making  
operations between a known object (the vehicle) and an unknown one (the topic).  Image 
schemas (as well as complex cognitive schemas) also operate through this metaphorical, 
connective process.  We connect new experiences with old experiences, organized in 
schemas and scripts, to help us understand and make our way through the new 
experience.  Metaphors, like schemas and framing, can both expand our categories of 
thought and restrict them (Fitzgerald, 1993).  They can reinforce old connections and 
categories or make new ones. 
 The comprehension of metaphors also follows a developmental trajectory.  
Winner, Rosentiel and Gardner (1976) discover that metaphorical production follows this  
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path: a child can spontaneously produce metaphors before he or she can comprehend 
them.  This is followed by an ability to explain the rational of metaphor.  Like adults, 
children also have an easier time of understanding metaphors whose components are 
semantically related then when the relationship is less clear (Cacciari, Levorato, & 
Cicogna, 1997).  Sietz (1997) found that younger children have a preference for more 
natural, concrete metaphors, whereas older children exhibit a preference for more 
abstract, socially constructed metaphors.  Sietz was testing for the “ability to detect unity 
in variety” (p. 348), a skill related to both metaphor comprehension and creativity.  When 
presented with a list of words grouped in triads, with two of the words metaphorically 
related and two related by surface similarities, younger children violated category 
boundaries based on an innate sense of similarity whereas older children violated 
category boundaries that relied on learning.  Seitz concludes metaphor is important in 
creative thought because metaphor does not merely highlight existing similarity but 
creates similarity.  Similarity, which is at the heart of metaphor, is, of course, a product of 
thought, and does not merely exist in the world.  
Assessing Moral Imagination 
To discuss whether moral imagination can be assessed, we must come to some 
definition of its outcome.  For this we turn to some of the definitions of imagination 
mentioned above.   
“Imagining is.. instantiating absent objects and events” (Sarbin, 1998). 
 
“Imagination is our capacity to think of things as possibly being so” (Egan, 1997). 
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“Imaginative capacity is … the ability to  look at things as if they could be 
otherwise …It is to see beyond what the imaginer has called normal or “common-
sensible” and to carve out new orders in experience” (Greene, 1995). 
 
“Imagination is an act of creation, a making of something new, the  reformation or 
combination of experience into new forms” (Singer, 1999). 
 
“Imagination… breaks through the inertia of habit” (Dewey cited in Greene, 
1995). 
 
Among these definitions (and, in fact, most definitions) there is a consensus that 
imagination is an act--a thinking, a doing, a making of something new.  As an act, we 
ought to be able to empirically verify its existence. It could be measured as the capacity 
of making up new things. 
Vygotsky defined creativity in a way similar to these definitions of imagination.  
He defined creative activity as one that constructs something new.  He distinguishes  
between reproductive construction (the rebuilding of existing reality) and combinatory 
construction, (the combination and changing of existing reality to new entities).  It is the 
latter that requires imagination and is seen as the basis for creativity (Ayman-Nolley, 
1992). 
Creativity and imagination are linked in our common-sense definitions as well. In 
a study in which parents and teachers from America and India were asked to find 
descriptive terms for creativity among a list of 15 terms (Runco & Johnson, 2002), the 
raw scores for Imaginative as a descriptor for Creative had the highest Likert scale 
average among the American parents and teachers as well as the Indian parents (4.80, 
4.83 and 4.31 respectively).  Indian parents rated Curious as equally descriptive of 
Creative as Imaginative (4.31) while American and Indian teachers rated it second most  
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descriptive (4.63 and 4.24 respectively).  Indian teachers viewed Inventive as the most 
descriptive term for Creativity (4.27) a trait the American parents placed second most 
descriptive (4.53).  All averages were from a scale of 1 (not at all descriptive) to 5 
(extremely descriptive). These results show Imaginative, Curious, and Inventive as the 
most descriptive of creativity among parents and teachers in both counties. 
One of the salient features of creativity and imaginative thought is divergent 
thinking. While not necessarily synonymous with creativity, it is often part of many 
creativity measures (Wakefield, 1991).  Divergent thinking is characterized by flexible 
cognitive functioning--a  capacity to represent problems in a variety of ways (Gallo, 
1989; Milgram,1983; Runco, Plucker & Lim, 2000).  In the literature on creativity, it is  
often measured as the capacity to think of new things to do with familiar objects 
(Milgram, 1983; Runco, Plucker & Lim, 2000).  
Milgram (1983) tested the validity of a procedure that measured ideational 
fluency.  From a sample of 7- to13-year old lower- to middle-class children with a variety 
of intelligence levels, she found that the ability to generate many solutions to a problem is 
strongly associated with the ability to produce a few original, high quality solutions.  She 
concluded that ideational fluency is a critical cognitive component of the creative process 
in children.  Runco et al. (2000) claimed that ideation is a valid empirical measure 
because ideas can be quantified in much the same way as other products.  He developed a 
23-item scale that measures three facets of divergent thinking:  originality (unique ideas), 
fluency (the quantity of ideas) and flexibility (the number if different ideas).  These three 
aspects of divergent thinking have been traditionally measured by asking subjects to  
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produce as many uses for a common item (e.g. a brick) as possible.  Fluency is 
determined by the number of ideas, flexibility by the difference between the ideas (not 
just variations on a theme) and originality by comparing the ideas within others in the  
sample (original means used by less than 5% of the sample) (Milgram, 1983).  There is 
an order effect for original thinking as well with the most original ideas coming after the 
common (or popular) ideas (Hong & Milgram, 1995).  Researchers in divergent thinking 
and evaluation have asked children to rate an idea produced by another child as creative 
(i.e., original) or popular.  Children were able to identify the popular ideas the best.  In 
adults of all contexts, the ability to evaluate ideas and the fluency of ideas are related and 
are significantly correlated, while in children, the correlation depends on the context of 
test format and group makeup (Runco, 2003).  In the moral realm, the question of the best 
solution is often in play.  Therefore, any test of imagination would, like creativity, 
involve divergent thinking and evaluative (convergent thinking) skills. 
 There are a number of theories and empirical studies to support them that link 
creativity and morality  (Gruber, 1993; Runco & Nemiro, 2003 ).  Grisanti and Gruber 
(1999) define moral creativity as “creativity for moral purpose.. when a moral imperative 
is present but the problem is so overwhelming as to challenge a person’s ability to 
address it--creativity becomes necessary” (p. 427, see also Gruber, 1993).  Some who 
research creativity by means of problem finding and problem solving skills use “real 
world” problems to assess these abilities.  The skills assessed in these and other studies 
(such as problem finding skill and evaluation) could be used to study how people solve 
moral dilemmas (Runco, 1993, 2003). 
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On the empirical side, Kyzer (2001) reported on a study of undergraduates that 
found a relationship between creativity and personal problems solving (self-reported).  
He cites another study of 9-12 year old children demonstrating that highly creative  
children have better coping skills in stressful situations of life and relationships.  The 
authors conclude that because they are able to think more fluently, flexibly, originally, 
and open-mindedly, more solutions are available to them in stressful situations and thus 
better coping skills.   
Mouchiroud and Lubart (2002) created three scenarios of conflict involving a 
friend (dyad), a group of peers and parents and presented these to a group of 6 – 11 year 
old children.  The children were encouraged to come up with as many solutions to the  
conflicts as possible.  The purpose of the research was to establish the existence of social 
creativity.  The result showed a moderately strong to strong correlation between the 
scenarios which gave rise to the claim by the researchers that the construct was valid.  
They also found a significant developmental trend with older children providing more 
solutions than younger. Based on findings in the literature, fluency is the main dependent 
measure that correlates originality with the number of ideas formed. 
In an exploratory study for his Ph. D. dissertation, (Rolison, 1986) developed an 
instrument to assess a person’s ability to generate alternatives in social, decision-making 
situations (the Rolison Real Issues Alternatives Test, RRIAT).  He found a positive 
relationship between moral development (measured by Rest’s DIT) and the RRIAT (r - 
.23 p< .03).  There is also a positive correlation between the ability to produce alternative 
uses for an object (Guiliford’s AUT) and the RRIAT (r = .33 p. < .01).  Age and general  
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knowledge were also positively related to generating alternatives in social, decision-
making situations (r = .21, p. < .05; r = .32; p. < .01, respectively). 
Assessment tools   
The results of these studies point to a possible method for studying moral 
imagination that would involve employing tests typically used in the study of creativity 
such as ideational fluency, originality, and flexibility and applying them to moral 
situations.  One could envision a task in which subjects were presented with moral 
dilemmas (perhaps drawn from Kohlberg’s original research or perhaps newly created 
dilemmas) and asked to come up with as many solutions as possible to the dilemmas.  
The results could be scored for fluency (number of ideas), flexibility (number of 
categories of ideas) and originality (less than 5% occurrence of the idea in the sample).  
To test evaluative skills, the participants could be asked to pick the one idea they think is 
the most practical and the one they think the most creative.  These ideas also could be 
analyzed for originality.  While there are certainly issues of reliability in coding 
responses and other complications, using the methods of assessment in the creativity 
domain for the purpose of measuring moral imagination seems a promising avenue of 
pursuit.   
Conclusion 
 Moral Imagination is a difficult subject to review, not only because of its 
complexity, but also because there is not a great deal of consensus in the literature over 
its definition, much less any established empirical investigation of it.  Thus we are left to 
our own imagination, to create new combinations of ideas, new categories, and new  
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methods with which to investigate them.  This has been the purpose of this paper.  By 
defining moral imagination as a narrative projection of action into the future through a 
process of dramatic rehearsal, the best methods for investigating would be to design a 
study in which participants are presented with short narratives (in the forms of dilemmas) 
and told to create as many endings to the dilemmas as come to mind.  By coding these 
responses in terms of fluency, flexibility, and originality, we could have a basis for 
assessing the moral imagination of an individual.  By further coding these responses for 
flexibility and originality in their use of metaphors, we would have a more complete 
understanding of the ability of the individual to use imagination in moral situations, since 
metaphors are a critical tool in moral reasoning (Johnson, 1993).  By adding a final task  
to the assessment and asking the participant to choose the best and most creative solution 
to the dilemma, we would get an even broader idea of the level of capacity for moral 
imagination in the individual since evaluation along with divergent thinking are critical 
skills in creativity and imagination (Runco, 2003).  No investigation into moral 
imagination would be complete without some assessment of the individual’s capacity for 
empathy.  A separate assessment would perhaps be necessary as an adjunct to the 
ideational fluency test to round out the picture of an individual’s potential for moral 
imagination.  The relationship of this assessment of moral imagination to the traditional 
measures of moral reasoning, such as the DIT, would be interesting to explore. 
 The goal of developing a measure for moral imagination would be to have a tool 
to assess programming and curriculum that would teach the skills needed for the 
development of moral imagination.  In a world in which the old solutions do not seem to  
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be working, it seems imperative that we develop this skill in our children, so that in the 
face of moral problems they have the fluency, flexibility, and originality of thought to 
“break through the inertia of habit” and create new orders of experience (Greene, 1995) 
that are more just and caring than exist at the present
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CHAPTER 2 
 
USING HOLLYWOOD FILMS TO TEACH MORAL REASONING AND  
 
GOOD CHARACTER:  EVALUATING A FILM CLIPS  
 
CHARACTER EDUCATION CURRICULUM 
 
Introduction 
 
In the later third of the 20th century two approaches to moral education have 
prevailed (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 2006; 
Walker, Henning, & Krettenauer, 2000) which have their roots in two “historic” visions 
of a child’s moral nature.  One approach, often called traditional character education 
(Bennett, 1993; Narvaez et al., 2006), has its roots in the assumption that children cannot 
on their own, without direct adult guidance, form a moral disposition.  The emphasis of 
the traditional character education approach places the driving force of moral formation 
of children in the hands of adults (parents, teachers, and others).  Concern with the 
content of moral education more than the process, the proponents of this approach see 
exposure to good moral role models, teaching values and traits that promote moral action, 
and reinforcing prosocial behavior as the most effective means of developing a moral 
disposition in a child.  
The rational moral education approach (Gibbs, 2003; Kohlberg, 1981; Narvaez et 
al., 2006) views children as having an innate capacity for positive moral growth. 
Proponents assume children bring capacities and experiences that shape their own moral  
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dispositions and are co-constructors of their moral formation.  This approach is based, in 
large part, on the work of Jean Piaget, who observed that children progressed in moral  
formation (from heteronomous to autonomous) when they took their moral life into their 
own hands (Hoffman, 2000; Piaget, 1962).  Rational moral education focuses on the 
process of moral development by emphasizing student participation through such  
methods as collaborative peer interaction (Moran & John-Stiener, 2003; Vygotsky, 
1978),  moral dilemma discussion (Kohlberg, 1981; Walker et al., 2000), a democratic 
classroom culture (Dewey, 1938), and role play (Gibbs, 2003). 
Entering the 21st century a consensus is developing that neither assumption tells 
the whole story of the moral child, but that moral formation is a complex phenomenon 
requiring both collaborative learning and content instruction, role play and good role 
models, a democratic school culture and morally authoritative adults (Berkowitz & Bier, 
2005; Walker et al., 2000).  A recognition that a moral disposition is multi-faceted and, 
like other psychological constructs such as intelligence (Gardner, 2004), involves 
complex sets of skills, traits, and abilities that can be acquired and expressed in multiple 
ways (Narvaez et al., 2006), has resulted in the design of programs in moral formation 
that feature a blending of content and process.  This study investigates a particular 
character education curriculum using film clips from Hollywood films to demonstrate 
both positive and negative examples of character traits listed in many character education 
curricula.  The curriculum takes a blended approach utilizing the film clip as the occasion 
for teaching the content of the character traits and reinforces good behavior by using the 
characters in the film clips as either positive or negative models, in line with the  
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traditional character education approach.  The methods of rational moral education are 
employed through subsequent discussion of the film clips and classroom activities that 
engage the student in forming a moral position vis-à-vis the character trait in question. 
The viewing of the film clips also becomes an occasion for role play, group discussion, 
and other collaborative learning events.   
The question of this study is: does this particular blended approach using film 
clips for character education work to enhance skills critical to moral development and 
moral action and, if so, why?  I will focus on three mechanisms present in the curriculum 
that the literature suggests play a role in moral development: training in cognitive 
perspective taking, training in affective perspective taking (empathy), and moral dilemma 
discussions. 
Perspective Taking and Moral Development 
Researchers and theorists of moral development have found it useful to delineate 
between different types of perspective taking (Carlo, Allen & Buhman, 2006; Eisenberg 
et al.,1998; Hoffman, 2000).  Social or cognitive perspective taking apprehends the 
thoughts, intentions, and situation of another.  Affective perspective taking involves an 
understanding of the emotional states of others.  Perceptual or spatial perspective taking 
concerns imagining the visual perspective of another (Eisenberg et al., 1998).  Knowing 
oneself as distinct from the other is a critical skill for perspective taking (Selman, 1971) 
and empathy (Batson, 1991).  
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Cognitive Perspective Taking. Cognitive perspective taking has long been 
recognized as an essential capacity for moral development (Lapsley, 2006).  Piaget 
recognized that a child can only advance in knowledge of the world in general and 
knowledge of the moral and social realm in particular with the ability to separate one’s 
own perspective from another in a social situation and to attend to it. Piaget’s two stages 
of moral development depend, in part, on this capacity.  The heteronomous stage requires 
at least the capacity to take the adult’s perspective and to conform to it, while the 
autonomous stage requires the more sophisticated ability to separate one’s own 
perspective from that of the adult (or other authority) and coordinate those perspectives 
along with the perspective of one’s peers in moral decision making and action (Gibbs, 
2003).     
Kohlberg (1981) placed role taking (a synonym for perspective taking) at the 
center of his moral stage theory.  “The centrality of role taking is recognized in the notion 
that moral judgment is based on sympathy for others” (p. 141).  While role taking 
includes both cognitive and affective perspective taking, the emphasis for Kohlberg was 
on the cognitive since he understood such concepts of justice, reciprocity, and equality as 
“part of the primary experience of role taking in social interactions” (p. 143). 
Affective Perspective Taking (Empathy).  Empathy is a complex response to 
others that includes both cognitive and affective perspective taking (Batson,1991; 
Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea,1991; Feshbach,1989; Hoffman, 1987; 
Roberts & Strayer,1996).  However, without an insight into the emotional state of others, 
empathy is not possible. Hoffman (2000) views perspective taking as a primary form of  
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empathic arousal. Eisenberg, Spinrad, and Sadovsky (2006) believe that the 
developmental increase in empathy supported by empirical data is due to the advances 
children make in perspective taking and an understanding of another’s feelings.  Strayer 
(1987) called affective perspective taking the sine qua non of empathy.  She states 
empathy involves a “leap of the imagination entailed in feeling as if we were the other 
person in his or her situation” (p. 223).  However, cognitive perspective taking still plays 
an important role.  In a test of their model of empathy, Roberts and Strayer (1996) 
demonstrated a significant correlation between cognitive perspective taking and empathy. 
Having a perspective on one’s own emotions as well as the emotions of others 
contributes to moral development. Research indicates that a child’s insight into his or her 
own emotion is positively related to empathy (Roberts & Strayer 1996), while training 
children to recognize verbal and nonverbal emotional cues and labeling those emotions 
also increase empathy (Eisenberg et al.,1998; Feshbach,1989; Frey, Hirschstein, & 
Guzzo, 2000).  Bengtsson and Johnson (1992) found that those who focused on the inner 
experience of a person when confronted by their plight had higher empathy scores.  
Eisenberg, Murphy, and Shepherd (1997) linked age-related advances in empathy to both 
affective and cognitive perspective taking in their study of empathic accuracy.  For 
Hoffman (2000), however, another’s emotional state can affect someone before the 
ability to distinguish between self and other has developed. 
  Perspective Taking and Prosocial Behavior.  It is the proper balance of a focus on 
one’s own emotions conjoined with the apprehension of the emotions of others that leads 
to prosocial responding (Batson, 1991; Carlo, Allen & Bulman, 1999; Eisenberg,  
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Wentzel, & Harris, 1998; Hoffman, 1987; Strayer, 1993).  Research demonstrates that 
high levels of personal distress in affective perspective taking inhibits prosocial 
responding (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Strayer, 1993).  Carlo et al. (1999) found that high 
levels of personal distress and low levels of perspective taking inhibited prosocial 
responding in a sample of college students, while the opposite (high perspective taking 
and low personal distress) promoted prosocial action.  They propose that personal distress 
causes one to focus on oneself more than the other, leading to a desire to alleviate one’s 
own distress rather than another’s.  Strayer (1993) found similar reactions in children.   
When observing the emotions of others in video taped vignettes, children whose 
emotional intensity levels were higher than the stimulus person’s showed lower empathy 
with others.  
Training in Perspective Taking: Induction.  Martin Hoffmann (2000) has 
developed a theory of how children form a moral disposition through the parent’s use of 
perspective taking in disciplining their children.  The technique he calls induction occurs 
when a parent takes the perspective of the victim when a child is about to harm or has 
harmed someone and demonstrates to the child how the child’s behavior harms the 
victim. Building on his concept of empathic distress, (not the same as personal distress, 
above) that develops from an innate proclivity to feel the feelings of another coupled with 
the cognitive ability to separate one’s own perception from others, Hoffman (2000) states 
that inductions:   
 a) … call attention to the victim’s distress and make it salient to the child, thus 
tapping into the child’s empathic proclivity (using it as an ally) by activating any 
or all of his or her empathy-arousing mechanisms and producing empathic 
distress, and b) inductions point up the role of the child’s action in causing that  
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distress.  This creates the condition for feeling empathy-based guilt, which is a 
feeling of intense disesteem for oneself for wrongfully harming another (p. 151). 
 
 These inductions form a kind of moral script for the child, called the 
Transgression–Induction–Guilt script.  These scripts are reinforced time and again, 
adding a moral dimension to the parent/child induction through the focus on the impact of 
the child’s behavior on others.  Eventually, the script can be activated in the absence of 
the parent (or other authority) and is reduced to a Transgression-Guilt script, becoming 
“less kinesthetic-imagistic and more semantic-propositional” (p. 161).  These scripts are 
activated in conflict situations with peers, and, insofar as the child is able to de-center 
(i.e., the child can take on the perspective of the victim on his or her own), the child can 
provide the parent’s induction of the victim’s perspective by himself or herself.   
 Krevans and Gibbs (1996) tested Hoffman’s theory that inductive discipline 
would lead to greater empathy and prosocial responding in children.  They found that 
children who exhibited high scores on prosocial behavior measures had parents who used 
inductive discipline.  Moreover, the researchers found that empathy mediated the 
influence of the use of inductive discipline by parents on the prosocial behavior of their 
children.  When the score of inductive discipline was included with the child’s empathy 
score as the independent variable with the child’s prosocial behavior score as the 
dependent variable, the resulting regression differed significantly from zero but the beta 
weight of the inductive discipline score was reduced and no longer significant. 
 Moral Expertise.  Induction and schema theory has not only impacted theories on 
the development of empathy (Hoffmann, 2000), but has provided a framework for 
researchers in the development of moral reasoning as well (Narvaez & Lapsley, in press;  
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Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a).  One direction that scholars have taken is to 
investigate the concept of moral expertise.  Partly rising out of Colby and Damon’s 
(1992) work on moral exemplars, researchers have begun to ask the question “What 
makes one a moral expert?”.  Narvaez and Lapsley (in press) look to schema theory and 
aver that it is “the chronic accessibility of moral schemas and other knowledge 
structures” that distinguish the novice from the expert in moral functioning (p. 10).  
Experts are adept at picking up salient clues in the environment and responding with the 
most appropriate action from a vast store of schemas to meet the need of the situation.  
Expertise is developed through learning behaviors that work, upon which they reflect to 
understand why they work and then practice those behaviors in an intentional way until 
they become automatic. According to this view “moral character may depend upon a kind 
of socialization that inculcates highly routinized action sequences, scripted interpersonal 
procedures, and patterns of discrimination and judgment” (Narvaez & Lapsley, in press, 
p. 12).  
 Rest et al. (1999a) use Cognitive Schema Theory to explain the development of 
moral reasoning originally posited by Kohlberg and measured by Rest’s Defining Issues 
Test (DIT).  They and others who follow their lead claim that those who exhibit the 
complex moral judgments of Kohlberg’s post-conventional moral reasoning stage “have a 
larger, better organized set of memory objects that can be activated within multiple 
cognitive fields and form part of complex mental models” (Narvaez & Bock, 2002, p. 
301).  Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, and Bentley (1999) tested this hypothesis with a group 
of eighth graders and college students.  After reading four texts in succession in which  
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moral stage schemas (1-5) were embedded, the students were asked to recall the general 
content of the story.  Results show that those with higher moral judgment scores (DIT) 
reconstructed significantly more stage 5 reasoning than did those with lower scores. 
Moreover, college students recalled significantly more stage 5 than stages 1-4 moral 
arguments than the eighth graders.  Narveaz et al. (1999) also report that students inferred 
reasoning not present in the stories, indicating that the prior knowledge of moral schemas 
influenced the recall of the stories. 
It is clear that both cognitive and affective perspective taking play a central role in 
moral formation and prosocial behavior.  Hoffmann’s theory of induction provides an 
adequate mechanism for how perspective taking works in the process of moral formation, 
building a foundational script or schema upon which subsequent moral action is built.  
Using the Narvaez and Lapsley  (in press) framework, it is reasonable to expect that 
training in perspective taking will make the Transgression–Guilt script that Hoffman 
postulates chronically accessible to the moral actor.     
A key component in the film curriculum under study here is the use of an 
inductive technique following the viewing of the film.  After each film clip is shown, the 
teacher asks a series of questions concerning the cognitive and affective perspectives of 
the characters in the film clip.  By such questions as “How do the characters feel in the 
situation they are in?” and “What was that character thinking when she said that to him?” 
the student is invited to take on the roles of the characters in the film clip, thereby 
promoting perspective taking in the students.   The curriculum also offers role play as an 
additional classroom activity after the film clip discussion if the teacher so chooses.     
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Studies of Training in Perspective Taking.  There have been numerous studies 
into techniques and programs that enhance prosocial behavior (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005).  
Some of them use perspective taking as a dependent outcome.  Many train perspective  
taking through role play but measure other outcomes.  One important early study by 
Feshbach (1983) evaluated a program intended to reduce aggression and promote 
prosocial behavior in the students in a Los Angeles city school district.  The children in 
the training group showed reduced aggression and a significant increase in incidences of 
cooperation, helping, and generosity through training in affect identification and 
understanding, role play, and emotional expressiveness.  Feshbach (1983) attributed the 
gains to the training and reinforcement of a child’s “ability to perceive situations from the 
perspective of other people, to discriminate and identify feelings and to express feelings 
that he or she may be experiencing” (p. 269).   
Another study particularly salient to the present study utilized video-taped skits 
instead of role play to train perspective taking (Silvern, Waterman, Sobesky, & Ryan, 
1979).  The training group viewed seven video-taped skits in which one of the two 
characters commits an error in perspective taking.  The skits were shown in an order that 
demanded increasingly advanced understanding of the motives and affects of the 
characters.  A discussion lead by a trained leader followed each skit and focused on 
identifying the perspective taking error.  The children then discussed alternative solutions 
to the problem presented in the skit and made their own video-taped skit.  This group was 
compared to an activity group that performed a number of semi-structured activities 
including drawing pictures of what it means to be a good friend, making a group plan and  
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rehearsing and video taping a skit.  In a t-test of group comparisons, the training group 
showed significant improvement in the sophistication of their perspective taking 
compared to the activity group and the no-treatment group.  Tests showed a similar result 
in affective perspective taking for the training group compared to the activity group and 
to the no-treatment group.  Improvement in the sophistication of perspective taking was 
positively correlated with affective perspective taking.  
 Iannotti (1978) used role taking and role switching in a series of skits to train 
perspective taking in a group of 30 kindergarten-aged boys and a group of 30 third-grade 
boys drawn from two different schools.  In the role-taking condition, the subjects 
physically acted out parts or explained what they would do in a situation presented in a 
story plus explain the effect of their actions on others.  In addition, a trainer asked 
questions to elicit role taking.  In the role-switching condition, the subjects changed roles 
every 5 minutes and experienced at least 5 different roles per session.  The trainer then 
asked questions about the experience of role switching.  The experimental groups at both 
schools showed significant growth in perspective taking compared to the control group in 
two different perspective-taking measures (Iannotti, 1978).  In a study that trained social 
perspective taking through role-playing experiences designed to help the subjects 
articulate and coordinate relevant perspectives in social situations along with relevant 
internal states of the individuals in the situations, Marsh, Serafica, and Barenboim (1980) 
found that, while the multivariate analysis showed only an overall trend for group 
differences  (training vs. control) on the social perspective-taking measure, the training  
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may have stabilized preexisting levels of social perspective taking.  The test-retest 
reliability was significantly higher for the training group (r=.76) than the control (r=.38). 
In evaluating a school-based conflict resolution program, Lane-Garon (1998) 
discovered that role plays using scripts from naturally occurring conflict on the 
playground helped to train perspective taking. Eighty students (41 treatment, 39 control; 
32 males, 48 females) in grades 4 to 6 were selected as subjects for this study and 
randomly assigned to a treatment group or control group.  The treatment group's gain in 
perspective taking scores was statistically significant compared to the control.  The 
author cites the ecologically valid content of the role play (scenarios from real conflicts 
from the playground) as a significant factor in the training.   
 In one of the rare quantitative studies examining the impact of a dramatic-arts 
exercise on empathy in children, Kruger, Samuelson, Kapsch, Flanigan, and Harris 
(2002) showed that middle school participants in a playwriting program made highly 
significant gains in empathy compared to a control group.  In that program, the children 
spent a large portion of their time learning about character development in playwriting, 
including exercises in paying attention to their own emotional experiences and taking the 
perspectives of others.  The plays that the students wrote were not acted out, and role play 
was not part of the program.  However, the study’s authors suggest the exercise of 
writing from another person’s perspective contributed to the gains in empathy. 
  Perspective taking, when induced, not only encourages empathy, but also 
promotes prosocial behavior.  In one study (Oswald, 1996), a group of subjects watched a 
video tape of a person talking about the difficulties of adjusting to campus life under  
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three conditions:  (a) focusing on the feelings of a person (affective perspective taking), 
(b) focusing on the thoughts of the person (cognitive perspective taking), and (c) focusing 
on the technical aspects of the taped presentation.  The subjects were then asked to 
volunteer time to help students adjust to campus life.  Those in the affective-perspective-
taking condition volunteered over 280% more time to the project than those in the 
technically-focused condition, while those in the cognitive-perspective-taking condition 
volunteered 60% more time that the technically focused group.  However, perspective 
taking alone does not promote prosocial action.  In a study testing the roles of trait 
personal distress and perspective taking in volunteering, Carlo et al. (1999) found that as 
trait perspective taking increased, volunteering increased when low levels of personal 
distress where present.  The presence of high levels of personal distress weakened the 
connection.  Training in perspective taking is more efficacious when levels of personal 
distress are kept low.    
 The conclusion drawn from the literature, therefore, is that perspective taking can 
be trained.  Two techniques that seem to work particularly well are role play and 
induction.  Role play is used as a strategy to teach values and concepts in character 
education (Farrell, Meyer, Sullivan, & Kung, 2003; Flay & Allred, 2003) as well as a 
technique for practicing prosocial skills and putting values into action (Caplan et al., 
1992; Gottfredson, Jones, & Gore, 2002; Taylor, Liang, Tracy, Williams, & Seigle, 2002; 
Twemlow et al., 2001).  Role play puts the subject into the situation of the other and 
gives the subject a direct experience of the thoughts and emotions one experiences in that 
situation.  Discussion about the experience of the role play is also an integral part of  
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the successful use of role play (Iannotti, 1978; Frey et al., 2000; Marsh et al., 1980).  The 
discussion portion employs the techniques of Hoffmann’s inductive-discipline approach.  
Induction focuses the subject on the feelings of the observed other–whether in a film or in 
a role play.  Moreover, the research literature shows that when perspective taking is 
induced, prosocial behavior increases and anti-social behavior (aggression) decreases 
(Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, & Cheesman, 1984).  
What is required for an induction to be efficacious is a stimulus that provides an 
appropriate emotionally salient experience for the subject.  Hoffmann would call this 
experience empathic distress  (Hoffman, 2000).  It must be appropriate because too much 
empathic distress can overwhelm the subject and become personal distress (Carlo et al., 
1999; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1995).  Some character education programs use stories and 
literature for this purpose, helping students to have imaginative experiences of another’s 
action and its consequence in order to inform their own moral choices (Flay et al. 2003; 
Solomon, Battistich, Watson, Schaps, & Lewis, 2000).  Role play can provide an 
emotionally salient experience as the actors take on roles in the play situation.  Because it 
is a “play,” there is enough cognitive distance to make the emotions of the situation 
appropriate for the induction of perspective taking.  Too much distance is also a 
possibility, as any teacher watching a role play devolve into giggles can attest.  Many 
studies used video tape as a stimulus for empathic distress (e.g., Sagotsky, Wood-
Schneider, & Konop, 1981).  This allows also for an appropriate amount of cognitive 
distance and reduces personal distress (a focus on one’s own emotions) and facilitates  
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empathic distress (a focus on the other’s emotion) and the possibility for the induction of 
perspective taking.   A poor quality video-tape, or less than convincing actors can again 
provide too much cognitive distance to produce empathic distress. In addition, these 
video-taped role plays do not have the same perceptual impact as professional Hollywood 
films because they do not employ the techniques of camera position and editing that 
mimic our perception of reality (Anderson, 1996).  As the Oswald (1996) study shows, a 
focus on the technical aspects of the video did not produce the perspective taking 
required to motivate prosocial action.  
Film as an occasion for perspective taking.  Film has an advantage over role play 
in providing an emotional stimulus to arouse empathic emotions.  When in a role play or 
when observing one, the participants are usually acutely aware that they are “playing” a 
scene, and not involved in or witnessing what might be called “reality.”  Often children, 
and especially adolescents, are painfully conscious of themselves in front of others and 
the emotions connected with self-consciousness tend to overshadow the emotions of the 
characters in the role play.  The observers also are aware that their mates are “acting” a 
role and that their emotions are contrived.  We may disbelieve that the scene we are 
witnessing is real or that the emotions are real when viewing a role play or being 
involved in one. When viewing film, however, especially films made by professionals, 
we suspend disbelief (Messaris, 1994) and perceive the film as real.  The techniques of 
Hollywood films are designed to lull our perceptual systems into believing that we are 
witnessing a real event (Anderson, 1996).  In fact, cognitive film theory purports that our 
perceptual systems do not distinguish between the light emanating from a screen and the  
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light bouncing off the surfaces of objects or between the sound waves coming from a 
speaker and the sound waves coming from a voice box or a musical instrument.  To our 
eyes and ears and the parts of the brain that process the information, it is all just light and 
sound waves.  Joseph Anderson (1996) states in his book The Reality of an Illusion that 
“it is the fact that the perceptual systems go through the same computational procedures 
whether confronted with the real world or with synthesized shadows and sounds that 
allows for the existence of cinema” (p. 23).    
Psychologists have long used film as a stimulus to induce emotion.  In doing so, 
they have inadvertently demonstrated the contention of cognitive film theorists that the 
brain makes little distinction between film and reality.  For example, in a study of the 
location of different emotions in the brain, the researchers showed subjects a number of 
film clips to elicit different emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust).  They analyzed both 
the facial expressions of the subjects and their EEG’s.  The facial expressions were used 
to verify the presence of the emotion they were targeting.  When the EEG was correlated 
in time with the facial criteria it was a reliable indicator of the presence of the experience 
of emotion in the subject.  The presence of both the facial expression and the electronic 
activity in the brain also verify an unspoken assumption of this and many similar studies: 
that the emotions stimulated by the viewing of films are the same as those experienced in 
“real life” (Tomarken, Davidson, & Hentiques, 1990).   In another study designed to 
locate emotion in the brain, subjects viewed a series of emotionally charged or neutral 
films and rated their emotional reaction to each clip while their brains were scanned using 
positron-emmission tomography (PET).  Viewing emotive films was associated with  
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increased activity in the amygdala, which correlated with better recollection of the film 
clips three weeks later (Lopez, 2001). The amygdala is where emotion is thought to be 
processed in the brain.  Film, then, affords similar engagement of emotion and cognition 
that would come from witnessing a real scene involving choice and consequences.  
Moreover, perspective taking and empathy are the very mechanisms that give film 
dramatic impact (Zillman, in press).   
  Film, in contrast to other techniques to teach perspective taking, has the advantage 
of allowing for emotional arousal to augment cognitive perspective taking.  The students 
can examine the emotions involved in the scene because they have more likely felt 
emotion from viewing the film.  Studies have shown that compared to viewing still 
images, viewing moving images has a dramatic impact on the physiological factors (heart 
rate, skin conductance) that indicate emotional arousal. Motion also captures and sustains 
the attention of the subject to the image (Simons, Detenber, & Roedema, 1999).  The 
emotional response to film engages students on two levels: (a) promoting emotional 
perspective taking and (b) capturing their interest.  The emotional response to the film 
affords an occasion for the induction of perspective taking similar to the process parents’ 
use in Hoffmann’s (2000) inductive-discipline technique.  Film viewing also allows for 
some distance from the direct experience of emotions so that the emotional response can 
lead to empathy instead of personal distress.  While emotions are stimulated as if 
witnessing the scene as reality, there is still an awareness that what is being viewed is an 
artifact–a representation of reality.  This cognitive distance is illustrated in a line often 
stated while watching a thriller: “It’s only a movie.”   Such cognitive distance provides a  
55 
better opportunity for the processing of the emotions required for the induction of 
perspective taking.   
While teachers have certainly used films in classrooms to discuss actions and their 
consequences, no systematic study of the use of Hollywood films (i.e., professionally 
produced films with superior artistic and technical merit) for character and moral 
development has been conducted to date.  Hollywood films have been used to help gifted 
children cope in school (Hébert & Neumeister, 2002).  Films from Hollywood are used in 
college-level psychology classes to illustrate such concepts as structural analysis of social 
behavior and personality theories with the students successfully understanding the 
theoretical concepts and responding favorably to the method of presentation (Paddock, 
Terranova, & Giles, 2001). However, no studies of using Hollywood films as a positive 
teaching method for character education exist.  This is perhaps because it is difficult to 
get permission for a systematic use of Hollywood films in published curricula.  While it 
is not illegal to show portions of films in the classroom, it is against copyright law to 
extract clips and reproduce them for distribution.  Permission for this type of 
reproduction was obtained for the curriculum created for the present study.   
Moral Development and Moral Reasoning 
Dilemma discussion. There are two critical experiences in the induction 
technique: (a) an experience of another’s emotional state and (b) a discussion about what 
caused the emotional state of the other.  When a parent is training perspective taking and 
empathy, the cause of the emotional state of the other is usually the child whom the 
parent is training.  The Film Clips curriculum simulates the induction technique by: (a)  
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giving the student an experience of another’s emotional state through viewing a film clip 
and (b) providing an opportunity for the student to consider the cause of the emotional 
state of the other in the discussion of the film clip.  Where this differs from the childhood 
induction experience is that the student has done nothing to cause the emotional state of 
the other on the film.  Nevertheless, it is instructive to discuss the cause of the emotion of 
the character on the screen, especially if the discussion helps the student consider whether 
he or she has ever been in a situation similar to the person in the film.  While the student 
does not experience personal guilt as in Hoffman’s “transgression-guilt” script, the script 
may none-the-less be enacted through the analysis of the empathic emotions felt students 
in response to the characters on the screen and the consideration by the student of an 
experience that was similar to the one depicted on the screen.  Moreover, in the 
curriculum training, the teachers were instructed to ask what the students might have 
done if they found themselves in a similar situation, with the hope of provoking an 
imaginative weighing of possible alternatives and potential courses of action similar to 
the classic dilemma discussions in the Kohlbergian tradition.   
Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) hypothesized that the ideal situation for advancement 
in moral reasoning was to be involved in a discussion with another person who reasoned 
at a +1 level from one’s own.  Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) engaged a group whose 
participants expressed reasoning at various levels in a dilemma discussion.  The 
experimenter then chose the argument that was one stage above the majority of the 
participants and supported it, emphasizing its strengths and encouraging participants to 
engage it thinking along these lines.  This method led to significant increases in Moral  
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Maturity scores.  In a review of the effectiveness of moral-development interventions 
using the plus one strategy using moral dilemma discussions, Enright, Lapsley, Harris, 
and Shawver, (2001) found that the vast majority (10 of 13) produced significant gains in 
moral reasoning.    Those studies that did not attain significance tended to be shorter in 
duration.  While the plus-one strategy has good support in the literature, other strategies 
also have been effective.  Walker (1982) found a significant effect on moral reasoning 
with exposure to persons who reasoned 2 stages above the subjects, while Berkowitz, 
Gibbs, and  Broughton, (1980) found the ideal stage differential was at a +1/3.  These 
studies support the Vygotskian notion of the “zone of proximal development”  that posits 
children learn best from a person who performs at a level just above the level of the child 
(Walker & Taylor, 1991).  Walker and  Taylor (1991) also found that hypothetical 
dilemmas were not predictive of children’s subsequent moral development, but that “real-
life” moral dilemmas from the experience of the child had the greatest impact.  
From these studies we can draw two conclusions: (a) real-life dilemmas that are 
drawn from personal experience are more efficacious for moral development than are 
hypothetical dilemmas and (b) there is a “zone of proximal development” in which 
dilemma discussions must take place in order for advancement in moral reasoning to 
occur.  From this we might infer about moral dilemma discussions what Piaget observed 
in his early studies of the moral life of children:  that peers are the best teachers because 
peers provide the best content and context for moral dilemma discussions.   In an 
investigation of strategies for interpersonal negotiation, Selman, Beardslee, Schultz, 
Krupa, and Podorefsky (1986), discovered that the adolescents who participated in the  
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study showed significantly higher reasoning levels in dilemmas in which peers were the 
protagonist vs. an adult protagonist and in dilemmas involving personal rather than work 
situations.  Along similar lines, Kruger (1992) discovered, in her investigation of moral-
dilemma discussions of young girls (M age =8.6 years) both with their peers and with 
their mothers, that peer discussions of moral dilemmas resulted in greater improvement in 
moral reasoning than did discussions between children and adults.  Kruger (1993) reasons 
that the greater symmetry of knowledge and power in the peer dyads compared to the 
adult/child dyads produced the freedom to entertain multiple perspectives resulting in 
measurable development in moral reasoning.    
It is this last point of the effect of symmetry, power, and freedom in moral 
discussions that is most salient to the Film Clips curriculum.  The moral message is 
delivered in a medium that is democratic, that is, it does not come from an authority (such 
as the teacher) but from a common experience of viewing a film clip providing symmetry 
in power and knowledge not only with peers, but with the teacher as well.  One could 
argue that because films and other visual media are preferred forms of communication for 
young people they feel superior in knowledge to the teacher at times.  Discussing the 
conflict or dilemma inherent in each scene with each other allows for the opportunity for 
effective growth in moral reasoning through two proven techniques: peer to peer 
discussion and conflicts and dilemmas that are true to life.   
Gibbs et al.(1984) used dilemma discussion to affect growth in moral reasoning 
with juvenile delinquents.  In their study they groups participants in their modal stage of 
reasoning. 87.5% of those pretested at modal stage 2 shifted to modal stage 3 after  
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participating in moral dilemma discussions, whereas only 14.3% of the control group at 
modal stage 2 made the shift to stage 3 at posttest. They view a moral stage as essentially 
a cognitive schema “that influences an individual’s selection, anticipation, interpretation 
and evaluation of a situational event” (p. 38).  Thus growth in moral reasoning involves a 
shift in the cognitive schema that governs moral deliberation and action.  
The Film Clips curriculum promotes perspective taking through the cognitive 
processing of empathic-emotional stimulation induced by viewing film clips containing 
examples of moral conflict and character traits.  The processing occurs through teacher-
led group discussion with a focus on the emotional impact of the actions of the characters 
in the film clips.  Moreover, the discussion of the moral conflict in the film promotes 
advancement in moral reasoning through exposure to higher-staged reasoning in the peer-
to-peer exchange of ideas.  In addition, the curriculum supplements the film clips with 
activities such as games and role plays that reinforce the themes in the clips and further 
develop the skills needed for prosocial development.  In the present study, subjects in two 
after-school programs in the state of Georgia were randomly assigned to participate either 
in a program  using the Film Clips Curriculum (treatment) or a standard after-school 
program (control).  Both groups were tested prior to the experimental group beginning 
the curriculum.  Both groups were tested again when the experimental group finished the 
curriculum (9 sessions).  The averred effect of the curriculum leads to three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.    Given the theoretical considerations for how empathy and 
perspective taking are trained through the cognitive processing of emotionally salient 
social situations outlined above (Hoffman, 2000) and how the viewing of film clips  
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affords an occasion for an emotionally stimulating experience along with the processing 
of that experience through classroom discussion, and with the demonstration in the 
literature that similar techniques (role play, video training) have been successful in 
training cognitive and affective perspective taking, I expected to see an increase in total 
empathy,  cognitive perspective taking, and empathic concern in the treatment group 
versus the control group as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 
1983). 
 Hypothesis 2.   Given the theoretical and research-supported connection between 
the influence of training and improving skills in perspective taking, empathy, and moral 
reasoning on prosocial attitudes and behavior outlined above, and the increase in 
perspective taking expected from the Film Clips curriculum, I further expected that the 
experimental group would demonstrate greater gains in concern for others compared to 
the control group as measured by the Concern for Others Scale (Solomon et al. 2000).
 Hypothesis 3.    Finally, given the role that schemas and scripts play in guiding 
moral thought and behavior outlined above (Lapsley & Narvaez, in press; Rest et 
al.,1999a) and how the experience of viewing and discussing film clips mimics the 
schema for perspective taking trained in early childhood through inductive discipline 
(Hoffman, 2000), I expected the experimental group to demonstrate an improved ability 
to recognize moral themes in stories more efficiently as measured by the Moral Theme 
Inventory (MTI, Narvaez et al., 1999).  Furthermore, given the theoretical and research-
supported connection between dilemma discussions and gains in moral reasoning 
outlined above, I expected the experimental group to demonstrate greater gains in moral  
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reasoning (reasoning at higher moral stages) than the control group as measured by the 
Moral Theme Inventory  (Narvaez et al., 1999).   
Method 
Participants 
The study began with 345 participants enrolled in 21st Century Community 
Learning Centers Programs in two rural, county-wide school districts, one in north 
Georgia, another in west Georgia.  Congress established the 21st Century Community 
Learning Centers Program as part of the No Child Left Behind Act (2002) awarding 
grants to rural and inner-city public schools to provide academic support as well as 
various enrichment activities, including drug and violence prevention and character 
education. The state of Georgia made the Film Clips curriculum a regular part of the 
enrichment activities in the state’s 21st Century Community Learning Centers.  
The participants in both counties were randomly assigned a number and then 
placed into one of two groups: even-numbered participants received the program as part 
of their after-school enrichment activities (treatment), while odd-numbered participants 
engaged in activities typical of their after school program such as homework help, arts 
and crafts, board and card games, and outside activities during the same period (control).  
The teachers sent permission slips home with all the students.  Only those who assented 
and those whose parents consented to their children’s participation in the research project 
were pretested (Northern County, n = 52; Western County, n = 293). 
Due to factors beyond the researcher’s control, each county implemented the 
program differently. The Northern County treatment group (n = 19) had two mixed-grade  
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classes (grades 3 through 6) with one teacher in each class.  The treatment group received 
the Film Clips program 1 hour per week for 9 weeks (hereafter called the 9-week 
condition). The Western County treatment group (n = 150) had five separate classes, one 
for each grade (grades 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), with two teachers per class.    The treatment 
participants received the program 3 separate hours per week for 3 weeks (hereafter called 
the 3-week condition).  Each treatment group received all 9 sessions of the program. 
The counties differed in the attrition of participants from pretest to posttest.  In the 
9-week condition, 6 treatment and 17 control participants did not take the posttest due to 
leaving the program or being absent on the day the test was administered.  This resulted 
in collected data from 29 participants (13 treatment and 16 control).  There were no 
significant differences in the pretest reading comprehension scores collected as part of the 
Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al. 1999) between the attrition group (n = 23) and the 
remaining sample (n = 29).  Because I collected the participant age data at posttest, no 
means testing for age differences between the attrition sample and remaining sample 
could be performed.   
The 3-week condition treatment program period fell near the end of the school 
year.  This did not leave the teachers time to give the posttest to the original pretested 
sample.  However, a subset of the original sample attended a special summer school 
session to help them pass the Criterion Reference Tests (CRT) necessary to enter the next 
grade (n = 77 or 26% of the original sample; treatment = 46, control = 31).  This group 
took the posttest at the beginning of the summer school session.  It must be noted, 
however, that because this group required further schooling for promotion to the next  
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grade, it no longer represents the general population of the students in the 3-week 
condition county, but consists of students with particular academic challenges.  
Compared to their counterparts who did not take the posttest (n= 216), the summer school 
group who took both pretest and posttest (n= 77) had significantly lower reading 
comprehension scores at pretest (t (291) = 2.23, p = .026).  As in the 9-week condition, I 
collected the participant age data at posttest; therefore, no means testing for age 
differences could be performed.   
The participants completed the pretest measures in one sitting in both conditions 
in the following order: The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI), the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI), and the Concern for Others Scale (COS).  The posttesting procedure was 
identical to the pretesting procedure.  In the two counties combined, 106 participants (59 
treatment, 47 control) were tested at both time points.  All 106 were able to complete the 
MTI each time.  However, 14 participants (8 treatment, 6 control) did not complete the 
entire battery at some point (either pretest, posttest, or both).  Therefore, the MTI data 
reported below are based on a sample of 106; The IRI and COS data are based on a 
sample of 92 (51 treatment, 41 control). Table 1 in the Results section shows the 
breakdown of the sample into relevant groups. 
Design and Procedure 
 
Description of program treatment.  The Film Clips for Character Education 
program consists of 9 discrete sessions, each based on a character trait chosen from a list 
of 27 character traits mandated by the Core Curriculum of the State of Georgia 
(www.glc.k12.ga.us/qcc).  The session themes are as follows (presented in this order):   
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Honesty, Cooperation, Respect, Good Sportsmanship, Kindness, Self-control, Courage, 
Loyalty, and Perseverance.  For each session, four film clips from popular films produced 
by major Hollywood studios are available for viewing on a DVD.   For example, on the 
theme of Honesty, the choices are film clips from Liar, Liar (Grazer & Shadyac, 1997), 
Cool Runnings  (Steel & Turteltaub,1997), Shrek  (Katzenberg et al., 2001), and 
Pinocchio (Disney, Sharpsteen, & Luske, 1940). No film has more than a PG13 rating, 
and no clip has any content that would garner more than a PG rating.   
Three criteria guided the choice of the film clips: (a) how well the clips illustrated 
the session’s theme character trait, (b) the appropriateness for a young audience, and (c) a 
presentation of a moral conflict, where possible.  The choices for the theme of honesty 
demonstrate these principles. Pinocchio (Disney, Sharpsteen, & Luske, 1940) is a classic 
story on the virtue of honesty and the consequences of dishonesty that has long delighted 
children.  In the clip, Pinocchio lies to the good fairy about why he did not go to school.  
As the lie “grows and grows” so does his nose. The fairy gives an explicit lesson on how 
a lie can grow until “it is as plain as the nose on your face.”  The dilemma for Pinocchio 
is to continue to lie to avoid punishment, or to “come clean,” as Jiminy Cricket says, and 
face the consequences.  In the clip from Cool Runnings  (Steel & Turteltaub,1997), a 
popular comedy starting the late John Candy, the coach (Candy) explains to one of the 
players on his Jamaican Bobsled team how he felt he had to cheat and lie to preserve his 
status as a winner.  His dilemma was to lie and save face or to tell the truth and to loose 
the regard of those around him.  In the animated film Shrek  (Katzenberg, Warner, 
Williams, Adamson, Jenson, & Marshall, 2001) a film popular with children of all ages,  
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the princess implores her friend the donkey not to tell Shrek the truth that she turns into 
an ogre at sunset, and that only the kiss from her true love will break the spell.  The 
dilemma is to tell the truth and risk Shrek’s friendship, or to lie and preserve it.   The film 
Liar, Liar (Grazer & Shadyac, 1997) has a global R-rating but the clip from the film was 
appropriate for children and fit our criteria exactly.  In the scene, a father is telling his 
young son to undo a wish the son made for his birthday that his father would tell the truth 
for 24 hours.  The father explains how he needs to lie to preserve his job.  He presented a 
dilemma to his son that is especially challenging to young people of late grade school and 
junior high age: should the boy obey an authority (his father) and undo the wish (even 
though he knows lying is wrong), or should he disobey his father and do what he feels is 
right?  Film clips such as the one from Liar, Liar (Grazer & Shadyac, 1997) that present 
the students with a choice between two “goods” (obeying an authority vs. insisting in the 
truth) are ideal for the type of dilemma discussion the curriculum endeavors to promote. 
 In the same manner, the activities suggested in the curriculum are designed to 
give the student an experience either a direct experience of practicing the character trait 
in question or an experience of making a choice between two conflicting goods.  The 
activity choices for Honesty include telling three things about oneself to the group, one 
true and two false.  The group tries to guess the false statements.  A discussion on the 
experience of the game concludes the activity.  Another suggested activity is a game 
sometimes known as “Dictionary,”  which actually rewards the player who can make up 
the most convincing false definition of an little known word.  The activities always  
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included the options of journal writing on the theme in question and a role play that 
reinforce the theme.   
 The curriculum does not prescribe a set order of events for each session but gives 
the teachers a number of options to design the session as they see fit.  The two 
components that are fixed are the viewing of the film clip and the discussion which 
follows the viewing.  In a typical session (as presented in the program training) a teacher 
introduces the theme of the day and perhaps asks some preliminary questions of 
definition (e.g., What is honesty?  How do you show honesty?).  The teacher would have 
chosen one or two of the four possible clips to show the class as illustrations of the theme 
character trait.  A discussion follows the showing of each clip with a particular focus on 
the feelings of the characters involved (e.g., How did the boy feel when his father lied to 
him all the time?) and the feelings of the students (e.g., How do you feel when you are 
lied to?).   
Training in the curriculum consisted of 2 sessions: one with all of the teachers in 
the 3-week program and the supervisor from the 9-week program and another with 3 of 
the 5 teachers in the 9-week program.  The remaining teachers in the 9-week program 
were trained by their supervisor, who was included in the original training.  In each 
training session I emphasized the two foci of the curriculum: (a) the use of the film clip 
as an example of a character trait (direct teaching) and (b) the importance of the 
discussion of the situation of the character in the film clip (dilemma discussion).  After 
showing a sample film clip, I demonstrated how the film clip can be used to help the 
children understand the meaning of the character trait in question.  Then I led the teachers  
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in a mock discussion, emphasizing the importance of identifying the feelings of the 
characters in the film as well as the feelings of the students as they watched the film.  I 
turned the discussion to the situation in the film and the choices the characters made and 
asked the teachers to help their students discuss if the characters had made good choices.  
I also encouraged the teachers to lead the students to discuss experiences in their lives 
similar to those demonstrated in the film.  I then demonstrated how, after the showing of 
one or two clips and the subsequent discussion, the teacher could then choose from a 
number of suggested follow-up activities including games, role-play, art projects, video 
taping, research, and cooperative projects by working through some examples.   
 An informal telephone survey with five of the seven teachers (two from the 9-
week condition, three from the 3-week condition) revealed these commonalities in 
implementation: 
1) The sessions lasted typically between 45 minutes and 1 hour. 
2) The focus of the sessions was the film clips.  The teachers used a minimum of two 
clips per session, often using all four clips, stopping for discussion after each clip. 
3) The discussions were teacher-led.  The students responded to direct questioning of 
the teachers.  The teachers noted that it was easy to get the children to talk.  
4) The teachers focused their questions on the feelings of the characters and asked 
how the children might feel under similar conditions.   The children often 
responded with examples of their own experience as it related to the scene. 
5)  The teachers reported that they did not have time for many follow-up activities, if 
any at all.    
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6) All nine sessions of the program were completed in both conditions. 
Instruments 
 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983).  The IRI is designed to assess 
four distinct aspects of empathy:  Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Fantasy, and 
Personal Distress. The measure is a 28- item self-report questionnaire consisting of four 
7-item subscales, each corresponding to these specific aspects of empathy.  The 
Perspective Taking scale measures the capacity to take another’s point of view in 
everyday life.  A sample from the Perspective Taking scale is “I sometimes try to 
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.”  The 
Fantasy scale measures the tendency to get into the feelings and actions of fictitious 
characters when reading books, or viewing movies and plays.  A sample item from this 
scale is “I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.”  The 
Empathic Concern scale measures the tendency when interacting with others to 
experience feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern.  A typical item from this scale 
is “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.”  The 
Personal Distress scale measures the tendency when confronted with the emotions of 
others to focus on one’s own feelings of personal unease and discomfort.  An item from 
this scale is “Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.”  The scores from the 
Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, and Fantasy Scales are combined to give a total 
empathy score  (Davis, 1983).  I will use the total empathy score in this study because it 
focuses on the self-reported empathic response of the subjects to another person (whether 
actual or fictional), leaving out the self-focused empathic response (personal distress).   
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The total empathy score is the score usually reported in the literature when measuring 
empathy. 
Davis (1983) reports that all four scales have satisfactory internal reliability (from 
.71 - .77) and test-retest reliability (.62 - .71).  Females score higher on all four subscales.  
The subscales show the following significant inter-correlations: Empathic Concern 
positively correlates with Perspective Taking (r = .33) and Fantasy Scale  (r = .33).  
Perspective Taking and Personal Distress have a negative correlation (r = -.23).  Davis 
compared his scale to other extant empathy measures.  He reported that the Perspective 
Taking scale significantly correlates with the more cognitively oriented Hogan Empathy 
Scale (r = .40) while the Fantasy and Empathic Concern scales significantly correlate  
with the more affectively oriented Mehrabian and Epstein Emotional Empathy Scale (r = 
.52 and .62, respectively).  In contrast, Perspective Taking showed lower correlations 
with the Mehrabian and Epstein Scale (r = .20) and the Fantasy and Empathic Concern 
scales had much lower correlations with the Hogan Empathy scale.  This indicates that 
while the IRI presents multiple dimensions of empathy, the Perspective Taking scale 
seems to measure cognitive perspective taking while the Fantasy and Empathic Concern 
scales measure affective perspective taking.  Davis (1983) confirmed the cognitive focus 
of the Perspective Taking scale and the affective focus of the Empathic Concern scale 
through further experiments.   Eisenberg et al (1991) demonstrated that Perspective 
Taking scores increase with age.  
 The Concern for Others Scale (COS).  The Concern for Others scale (Solomon et 
al., 2000) is a prosocial attitudes, self-report instrument.  It was originally developed in  
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the early 1990’s by the Developmental Studies Center of Oakland, California to assess 
the impact of the Child Development Project program on the prosocial attitudes of the 
California public school children.  The program utilized student collaboration, a 
literature-based approach to reading, and a student-centered approach to classroom 
management, along with role play, games, and other interactive learning techniques.  This 
program has proven successful on many outcomes, including intrinsic and extrinsic 
prosocial motivation, altruistic attitudes, and concern for others.  Solomon et al. (2000) 
developed many instruments geared toward late grade school aged children (grades 3-6) 
to assess the outcomes of this program including the Concern for Others Scale.  The scale 
has internal consistencies measured by Chronbach’s alpha ranging from .74 to .81.   
 The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI; Narvaez et al. 1999).  The MTI uses moral 
stories to assess the ability of the subject to recognize moral themes in real-life situations 
and to reason about these stories by recognizing similar stories and choosing a correct 
summary statement of the stories.   The measure consists of 4 stories about moral 
dilemmas.  Each story has a complex moral message and contains a dilemma that the 
protagonist in the story resolves.  The protagonist solves the dilemma in the story by 
making a choice guided by the values affirmed in the theme of the story.  The four stories 
are titled after their protagonists: “Kim,” “California,” “Jed” and “Malcolm.”  In “Kim” 
the theme is honesty and the values affirmed are being honest with everyone, even 
strangers, and using self-control to be honest (Kim receives too much change from a 
cashier).  The story of “California” is a modern version of the Hans Christian Andersen 
story, “The Boy and the Dike.”  Its theme is caring, and it asserts the values of self- 
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sacrifice and perseverance to help others.  The theme of “Jed” is being true to your word, 
and it demonstrates the values of trustworthiness and doing one’s duty.  “Malcolm” 
presents the theme of a conflict of loyalty.  It asserts the value of telling the truth to 
strangers even at great costs. 
 The sequencing of the tasks is as follows, repeated for each story.  The students 
read along with an audio-taped version of the story and then answer10 true/false 
statements to test reading comprehension.  They then complete four tasks measuring 
moral theme comprehension related to the story: 
1) Vignette rating: The first of four vignettes (paragraph-long stories with the same 
or different theme) is read out loud on audio-tape, and the participant makes a 
rating before the reading of the next vignette.  Participants rate the vignette 
according to how closely it matches the original story’s theme using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale.  This process is repeated for all four vignettes. One of the four 
vignettes is the target vignette (correct response).  It has different actions and 
different actors but the same moral theme as the story.  The three distractor*  
 (incorrect) vignettes vary systematically on so called “superficial characteristics,” 
(i.e., character, action and setting).   One uses the same action but different actors, 
another uses the same actors but different actions, a third uses the same setting 
only.  
 
* Distractor is a technical term used by Narvaez et al. in their 1999 study that reflects the 
intentional design of the statement to “distract” the subject from the correct response. 
72 
2) Vignette choice: Participants select the one vignette of the four presented that best 
matches the theme of the original story. 
3) Message rating: In this section, seven (or eight) short statements relating to the 
moral theme of the story are read aloud.  After each is read, participants rate each 
of seven or eight messages according to how well each matches the theme of the 
original story using a 5 point Likert-type scale.  There are two correct messages 
that reflect the moral theme of the story.   
The five remaining messages are labeled distractor messages.  They are intended 
to distract the subject from giving the two correct messages the highest rating, and 
also from later choosing them as reflective of the story’s moral theme.  The theory 
is that those who are more practiced at moral reasoning will ignore the distractors 
and make the correct choice. The five distractor types are:   
 A)  Stage1 theme distortion (a focus on reprisal).  The theme of this message 
 statement is that the protagonist did the right thing out of fear of punishment.  
 This and the next two distractor types are based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s 
 moral judgment stages 1-3 (Rest et al. 1999a).    
 B)  Stage 2 theme distortion (a focus on personal gain or loss).  The theme  
 of this message statement is that the protagonist acted out of self-interest.  
 C) Stage 3 theme distortion (a focus on gaining or loosing approval of others).  
 The theme of this message statement is that protagonist receives from others 
 praise for doing the right thing or scorn for doing the wrong thing.  
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 D) An item that focused on the priority of the “in-group” (collectivism).  The 
 theme of this message is that the protagonist chooses the action that will benefit 
 those to whom he or she is closest; and  
 E) An item using multi-syllabic, “grown-up” words. 
4) Message choices.  Participants select two choices that best match the theme of the 
original story. 
 The scores for each task are derived in the following way.  This procedure is 
repeated for the four moral stories. 
  A) Vignette Rating [VR]: The difference between the participant’s Likert-type 
rating on each incorrect vignette and his/her rating of the correct vignette is calculated, 
and then these differences are added together.  For example, if a subject rated the correct 
vignette a 4, and rated the incorrect vignettes a 3, a 1, and a 5 respectively, the [VR] score 
would be (4 – 3) + (4 – 1) + (4 – 5) = 3.   
B) Vignette Choice [VC]: The credit for the correct vignette choice is 1 point; an 
incorrect choice is 0.   
 C) Message Rating [MR]: First, the ratings of the two correct messages are 
averaged.  Then the difference between each of the ratings for the distractor (incorrect) 
items and the average of the two correct theme choices is calculated, and these 
differences are summed.  For example, if the subject rated the correct theme messages a 3 
and a 5, respectively, the average of 3 and 5 is 4.  The rating of each distractor (incorrect) 
message is subtracted from 4.  If those ratings were 2, 1, 4, 3 and 1, the subsequent [MR] 
score would be (4 - 2) + (4 - 1) +  (4 - 4) +  (4 - 3) +  (4 - 1) = 9.    
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D) Message Choice [MC]: Since there are two correct theme choices from seven 
possible messages, the score for this section can be 2 (both correct messages chosen), 1 
(one correct choice) or 0 (no choices correct).   
The four scores are then added together for a comprehensive score ([VR] + [VC] 
+  [MR] +. [MC] = [CS]) for each moral story.   In the original study (Narvaez et al., 
1999), the scores for each of these four combination variables for each of the four stories 
were added together for a composite moral comprehension theme score and the reliability 
of the composite score (across four stories and four tasks) using Cronbach’s alpha is .89.  
In the present study, I used two stories at pretest (“Kim” and “California”), and I 
combined the scores generated from the responses to the two stories to form the pretest 
comprehensive score.  I used the two remaining stories at posttest (“Jed” and “Malcolm”) 
and combined the scores generated to form the posttest comprehensive score.  This is the 
first time this measure has been used in a pretest/posttest format to evaluate a program.  
Since the stories were read via audiotape to the subjects at one sitting, they were not 
counterbalanced.  
 In the statistical analysis, I summed the ten true/false questions from each of the 
four stories that measured reading comprehension to create a total reading comprehension 
score.  This score, derived from a total of 40 questions, is used as a covariate in many of 
the statistical analyses of this study.  I used this same score to compare the samples for 
compatibility.   These questions contained both true and false facts and true and false 
inferences.  The expectation is that a good reader would make the true inferences given 
the causal supporting evidence in the story. Over all 4 stories in the true/false section  
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there are 12 true facts, 11 false facts, 7 true inferences and 10 false inferences randomly 
ordered for each story.  Cronbach’s alpha for these 40 questions is .81. (Narvaez et al. 
1999).  
  Narvaez et al. (1999) found significant differences in the performance on the MTI 
by age, even after controlling for reading comprehension. That is, with increasing age, 
(3rd grade, 5th grade, and adult) correct performance improved.  Moreover, younger 
participants are more attracted to distractors at lower stage moral reasoning than their 
older counterparts, leading the researchers to conclude that moral judgment development 
impacts moral theme comprehension. 
 Moral Stage Attraction.  The total comprehensive score of the MTI includes the 
totals of four separate sections (VR, VC, MR, MC) as outlined above.  The third section 
(the Message Rating  section) requires the participant to choose two statements from a 
series of seven (or eight) statements that best describe the point of the story.  Among 
those seven statements are the two correct choices and five distractor choices:   
1-3) Three statements that echo the theme of the story in terms of Rest’s version 
of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages (stages 1-3);   
4) A statement that reflects the priority of the “in-group” (collectivism), and   
 5)  A nonsense statement using multi-syllabic words.   
 The three statements based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s first three moral 
judgment stages recast the moral of the stimulus story with the following distortions: 
Stage 1: a focus on punishment as a motive for doing the right thing (avoiding the 
wrong); Stage 2: a focus on how right action results in personal gain; and, Stage 3: a  
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focus on how right action will gain or loose the approval of others.   The participant 
attained the maximum score for this section if he or she rated the two correct theme 
choices at a five (on a 1 to 5 Lickert-type scale) and all other statements (the 
“distractors”) a one.  However, this scoring is not sensitive to any change in moral 
reasoning levels.  For example, the participant attracted to Stage 3 distractors (indicated 
by giving them the highest rating [5]) is penalized the same amount as the participant 
who rated the Stage 1 distractors at the highest level.  Moreover, it is possible that the 
relative attraction to the various stage distractor statements could change due to the 
intervention.  Thus, a treatment subject who was attracted to Stage 1 distractor statements 
at pretest, could be more attracted to Stage 2 or 3 distractor statements following the 
intervention, reflecting the beginning of growth in moral reasoning.  Yet that participant 
would not necessarily post an increase in the overall MTI comprehensive score.  
 For the purposes of looking at micro changes in moral reasoning, an alternative 
scoring procedure was used.  In the Message Rating section of the MTI, the ratings of the 
three distractor statements based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages 
(Stages 1-3, Rest et al., 1999a) were separated from the rest of the data.  The ratings of 
these three statements are chosen because they were based explicitly on Kohlberg’s moral 
judgment stages, and the moral reasoning stage of the participants is most likely to 
fallwithin the parameters of the first three stages due to their age (Narvaez et al., 1999; 
Rest et al., 1999a).  In order to differentiate the attraction of the participant to each 
statement and each moral judgment stage, I weighted the value from the Likert-type scale 
assigned by the participant to the various moral stage distractors to reflect the stage of  
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reasoning of the distractor statement.  Thus, I multiplied the value assigned by the 
participant to the Stage 1 distractor by 1, the value of the Stage 2 distractor by 2 and the 
value of the Stage 3 distractor by 3.  I then added these three weighted values together to 
obtain a total weighted stage score for both pre-test and post-test.  For example, if a 
participant gave the Stage 1 distractor statement a rating of 4, the Stage 2 distractor a 
rating of 2 and the stage 3 distractor a rating of 1 at pretest, the pretest Moral Stage 
Attraction for that story would be 11 ((4x1) + (2x2) + (1x3) = 4 + 4 + 3 =11).  The two 
weighted scores for each pretest story were added to obtain a total pretest Moral Stage 
Attraction score.  The posttest Moral Stage Attraction score is the total weighted ratings 
from the two posttest stories.  The resulting continuous variables allow for a comparison 
of participants relative to the level of moral reasoning to which they are attracted.  A high 
score means the participants were attracted to statements that reflected higher levels of 
moral reasoning (a rating of 2 on the statement reflecting Stage 3 reasoning scores higher 
(2x3=6) than the highest rating on the Stage 1 statement (5x1=5)), whereas a low score 
means participants were more attracted to lower stages and less attracted to higher stages 
of moral reasoning reflected in various distractor statements.  A comparative analysis of 
the total Moral Stage Attraction will comprise part of the overall data analysis. 
 The ratings of the Stage 1, 2, and 3 distractor messages also can be of use to 
assess whether subjects are in a consolidation or transition phase in their moral reasoning 
(Thoma & Rest, 1999, Walker et al., 2001).  While the ratings of the distractor messages 
do not give a researcher the precise modal stage at which the participant is reasoning, 
they do give an indication of the stage of moral reasoning that the participant thinks is the  
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most sensible to explain the actions of the protagonists in the story.  So, while a 
participant may not be able to generate reasoning at Stage 3 in a Moral Judgment 
Interview (MJI, Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) for example, that participant shows an 
attraction to the reasoning of stage 3 by giving a high rating to the Stage 3 distractor.  
From the discussion of the consolidation/transition model in moral reasoning 
development above, Walker et al., 2001 showed that the direction of bias is a powerful 
predictor of one’s moral stage transition.  A person showing a positive bias (i.e., attracted 
to reasoning more above his or her current modal stage of moral reasoning than below), is 
thought to be in the transition phase, while a person in a consolidation phase has a 
propensity to be attracted to reasoning more at or below his or her modal stage of moral 
reasoning than above.   
 The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI), like the DIT, uses tacit recognition of 
representative statements of various stages of moral reasoning rather than asking test 
subjects to articulate their own justifications for moral positions and scoring those 
responses according to their moral stage as in the MJI (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  Rest, 
et al, (1999a, 1999b) defend the use of recognition of moral stage reasoning in the DIT 
versus the production moral reasoning in the MJI as an equally valid form of measuring 
stage of moral reasoning with the additional advantage of measuring the implicit moral 
understanding of an individual perhaps beyond the individual’s capacity to consciously 
produce in an interview.  However, in contrast to the DIT and the MJI, the MTI does not 
ask test subjects to solve a moral dilemma, but only to recognize a moral theme in a 
story.  The moral theme of the story that the student must recognize is restated  
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in the universal terms implied in the story (the correct response) and also in terms that 
reflect stages 1-3 of Kohlberg’s moral stages (as well as in “in-group” language and in a 
nonsensical, large word sentence).  The premise of the test is that those who operate out 
of a higher stage moral schema would recognize the universal application of the moral of 
the story whereas those who operate out of lower stage moral schemas would be 
“distracted” by the restatements of the story theme reflecting Kohlberg’s stages 1-3. 
Results 
 Due to the significant attrition rate, I had interest in combining the participant 
groups from the two counties to increase sample size for hypothesis testing.  To explore 
that possibility, testing for between-county differences was necessary, especially given 
county-specific variation in student characteristics and form of implementation. To be 
conservative, I conducted these analyses on the smaller sample (n=91) with complete 
data records.  (See Table 1 for means.) There is a significant difference in age between 
the 9-week condition and the 3-week condition treatment groups (t(48) = 2.19,  p <.05). 
There is a significant difference between the 9-week condition and the 3-week condition 
control groups in age (t(39) = 2.65  p < .05) and in reading comprehension (t(39) =  -4.29  
p < .01).  These differences in student characteristics and the implementation differences 
preclude combining either the treatment or the control groups from the two counties.  I 
also conducted an investigation between the treatment and control groups within each 
county. There are no significant differences in age or reading comprehension between the 
3-week condition treatment and control groups. In the 9-week condition there are  
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significant differences in both age (t (23) = -2.58, p < .05) and reading comprehension (t 
(23) = 2.37, p < .05) between the control and treatment groups. 
Table 1 
Between-Condition Comparisons of the Population Characteristics of Treatment and  
Control Groups 
3-week condition (low achievers) 
             
 Completed All Measures  Completed MTI  
 
Characteristic   Treatment Control Treatment Control  
 
Total N   38  29  46  31  
 
n  males   24  13  27  15   
 
M age    12.6*  11.7**  12.3  11.6**   
 
Age Range   9 – 16  8 – 15  8 – 16   8 – 15   
 
M reading comprehension  15.22  13.94** 15.19  14.16*   
 
9-week condition (average achievers) 
             
 Completed All Measures  Completed MTI    
 
Characteristic   Treatment Control Treatment Control  
 
Total N   12  13  13  16   
 
n  males   9  8  9  9   
 
M age    11.3*  10.2**  11.5  10.2**   
 
Age Range   10 – 12  9 – 12  10 – 12  9 – 12   
 
M reading comprehension  16.29  17.96** 16.5  17.81*   
 
*  p < .05,  ** p < .01; Indicates significant differences by group between conditions. 
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 Therefore, the analysis will proceed in three sections:, First, I will test the effect 
of the intervention by comparing the treatment and control groups in the 3-week 
condition.   Second, I will conduct another test of the effect of the intervention by 
comparing the treatment and control groups of the 9-week condition, controlling for their 
differences in age and reading comprehension. Third, since the unplanned difference in 
implementation allows a chance to compare the efficacy of delivering the treatment in 
either a 3-week period or a 9-week period, I will conduct a post-hoc comparison of the 
treatment groups from each condition to test the effect of the difference in 
implementation, controlling for their differences in age.  Within each of the three sections 
seven outcomes will be reported. 
1) Total score from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)  
2) Empathic Concern  subscale of the IRI 
3) Perspective Taking  subscale of the IRI  
4) Fantasy  subscale of the IRI 
5) Total Concern for Others (COS) score 
6) Comprehensive score of the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI) and  
7) Total Moral Stage Attraction score 
 Of the many statistical methods used to evaluate treatment effects on two groups 
in a pretest – treatment – posttest design, the ANCOVA provides the greatest power and 
likelihood of finding a significant difference between groups (Stevens, 2001), by using 
the posttest as the dependant variable and the pretest as (one of) the covariate(s).  The 
assumptions of the ANCOVA require the covariate(s) to have a linear relationship with  
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the dependent variable and the regression slopes be equal within each group (no group x 
covariate interaction).  When the pretest regression slopes for each group prove to be 
unequal, I use a two-way, repeated-measure ANOVA (or ANCOVA) with one between 
factor and one within factor. The between group factor was either group membership in 
the treatment group between the counties or group membership within each county.  The 
within factor was always the pretest and posttest of the measure under analysis. In the 
cases where the repeated-measure analysis required a covariate, (a repeated-measure 
ANCOVA), the covariate used always conformed to ANCOVA assumptions. The stricter 
Greenhouse-Geisser statistic was used to control for sphericity in all ANCOVAs or 
ANOVAs that have within-subjects factors. 
Within-3-week Condition Comparison of Control and Treatment Groups  
 IRI total empathy score.   For the subjects from the 3-week condition who 
completed all the measures (treatment n = 39, control n=28), an independent t-test 
comparing the mean age and reading comprehension scores of the treatment and control 
groups shows no significant differences. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 10.40, p < .001).  A 
two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor 
(Total Empathy score at pretest and posttest) was therefore conducted.  No significant 
main effect for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction is found. 
 IRI Empathic Concern (EC) score.   The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 3.70, p < .05), 
meaning the assumptions were not met.  Therefore, a two-way ANOVA with one  
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between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (EC score at pretest and 
posttest) was conducted.  The results indicate no significant main effect for time of 
measure or group x time of measure interaction. 
 IRI Perspective Taking (PT) score.  The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 4.69, p < .05), and 
the necessary assumptions were not met. Therefore, a two-way ANOVA with one 
between factor (treatment and control groups) and one within factor (PT score at pretest 
and posttest) was conducted. The results indicate no significant main effect for time of 
measure or group x time of measure interaction. 
 IRI Fantasy Scale (FS) score.  The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 3.78, p < .05).  A 
two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (FS 
score at pretest and posttest) was therefore conducted.  The results indicate no significant 
main effect for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction. 
Concern for Others Scale (COS).  The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,62) = 9.31,  p < .001), 
meaning the assumptions were not met.  Therefore, a two-way ANOVA with one 
between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (COS score at pretest and  
posttest) was conducted. The results indicate no significant main effect for time of 
measure or group x time of measure interaction. 
 MTI Comprehensive Score.  The 31 control subjects and 46 treatment subjects 
from the 3-week condition who completed both pre- and posttest of the MTI (N = 77)  
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showed no significant differences in reading comprehension score or age allowing the 
consideration of an ANCOVA analysis with pretest as the covariate.  However, as stated 
above, it is suggested that the reading comprehension score also be used as a covariate in 
the analysis.  The test of ANCOVA assumptions results a significant group (treatment, 
control) x reading comprehension score interaction precluding the use of that variable as 
a covariate (F (2,54) = 3.60, p < .05).  Again, as in the previous comparison of the 
treatment groups, since the assumptions with the pre-MTI comprehensive score were met 
(no significant group x pre-MTI comprehensive score interaction) and the reading 
comprehension score and the pre-MTI comprehensive score significantly correlate (r = 
.420, p < .001), we can get a meaningful analysis by using just the pre-MTI 
comprehensive score as a covariate.  Thus, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted with 
theMTI comprehensive score at posttest as the dependent variable, the pre-MTI 
comprehensive score as covariate and the two within-county groups (treatment, control) 
as fixed factors.  Results indicate no significant difference in the means of the two 
groups.  
 The Moral Stage Attraction Score. The Message Rating section of the MTI asks 
the participant to rate a series of message statements according to how well the statement 
reflects the “best meaning” of the story.  Of the seven messages statements, two are 
correct choices and five are distractor (incorrect) choices.  Three of these distractors are 
based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages (Stages 1-3).  To assess the 
change in attraction to higher stage reasoning from pre- to posttest between groups, the 
value each participant had assigned to the various moral stage distractors was weighted to  
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reflect the stage of reasoning related to the distractor statement.  Thus, the Likert-type 
scale value assigned to the Stage 1 distractor was multiplied by 1, the value of the Stage 2 
distractor multiplied by 2, and the value of the Stage 3 distractor multiplied by three.  
These three weighted values were then added together to obtain a Moral Stage Attraction 
score for each story.  The scores associated with the four stories were summed to yield a 
Total Moral Stage Attraction score, one for pretest and one for posttest. (See Instruments 
section above.)  
 An analysis that includes between subject and within subject comparisons is 
preferable to one that focuses on means testing between groups such as an ANCOVA in 
testing for differences between groups on the Moral Stage Attraction Score.  Therefore, a 
two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (the 
Moral Stage Attraction score at pretest and posttest) was conducted.  There is no 
significant main effect for time of measure but there is a significant group x time of 
measure interaction (F (1,75) = 5.45, p < .05;  partial eta2 = .068, observed power = .635).  
The group means show an increase in the treatment group in Moral Stage Attraction over 
time, while the control group showed a slight decline (see Table 2 for means).  This 
shows that although there appears to be no effect of the treatment on the comprehensive  
scores of the MTI, subtle changes in moral reasoning may be affected by the treatment as 
measured by Moral Stage Attraction. 
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Table 2 
Group Means of the Between-condition and Within-condition Comparison of Groups for 
Moral Stage Attraction.   
Group      time  M  SD 
3-week treatment  pre  11.65  4.02 
post   14.02  3.41 
3-week control  pre  13.08  4.02 
    post   12.66  3.96 
9-week  treatment  pre  12.53  3.60 
                                    post  10.62  4.57 
9-week control  pre  13.09  5.08 
    post   11.28  5.10 
 In summary, when comparing the control and treatment groups within the 3-week 
condition, statistically significant gains in either group are revealed in only one analysis..  
The participants in the 3-week condition treatment group gave significantly greater 
ratings to statements that reflect higher stages of moral reasoning at posttest than they did 
at pretest, compared to the control group.   
Within-9-week condition Comparison of Control and Treatment Groups  
 Although the subjects were randomly assigned to control and treatment 
conditions, the 9-week condition sub-sample  shows an unequal distribution of age and 
reading comprehension between the groups.  Among those in the 9-week condition who 
completed all the measures (n = 29) a significant difference in both age (t (23) = -2.58,  p  
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< .05) and reading comprehension (t (23) = 2.37,  p < .05) exist between the control and 
treatment groups.  Among those that completed at least the MTI (N = 29), there is no 
significant difference between the control and treatment groups in the 9-week condition 
on reading comprehension, but there is a significant difference in age (t (27) = -2.37, p < 
.05).  However, since the suggested analysis of the MTI includes using reading 
comprehension as a covariate, age and reading comprehension will be used as covariates 
on all the tests.  
 The Total Empathy Score, the EC, PT and FS subscales of the IRI and the COS.    
These measures were all tested with the same procedure: a two-way ANCOVA with one 
between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (score at pretest and posttest) 
with reading comprehension score and age as covariates. In each case, assumptions for 
the ANCOVA were met (no significant group x covariate interactions). With all 5 
measures, no main effect for time of measure or significant group x time of measure 
interaction was found.   
 MTI Comprehensive Score.   To test for differences between the groups on the 
outcome of the MTI comprehensive score, a two-way ANCOVA with one between factor 
(treatment, control) and one within factor (MTI comprehensive score at pretest and 
posttest) was conducted with age and reading comprehension as covariates.  The 
assumptions for the ANCOVA were met (no significant group x covariate interactions). 
A significant main effect for time of measure was demonstrated (F (1,25) = 7.59, p < .05) 
with all subjects scoring better on average over time.  This was clarified by a significant 
age x time of measure interaction effect (F (1,25) = 6.16, p < .05) with older subjects  
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doing better over time than younger.  However, there was no group x time of measure 
interaction. 
 The Moral Stage Attraction Score.  A two-way ANCOVA with one between 
factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (the Moral Stage Attraction score at  
pretest and posttest) was conducted. There is no significant main effect for time of 
measure and there are no significant interactions.  See Table 2. 
In summary, no treatment effects were demonstrated in the 9-week condition on any of 
the measures including the Moral Stage Attraction analysis when comparing the 
treatment group to the control.  
Post-Hoc Between-Condition Comparisons of Treatment Groups 
 Since the treatment was implemented differently in the two counties, I had the 
opportunity to compare the efficacy of delivering the treatment in a shorter, more intense 
manner (over a period of three weeks, three times a week) versus over a longer period 
with less frequency per week (a period of nine weeks, once a week).  Therefore, the 
analysis will proceed with a comparison of the treatment groups between conditions.  
 IRI total empathy score.   The students in the two treatment groups who 
completed the full battery differ significantly in age. Therefore, every analysis involving 
the IRI, its subscales, and the COS will use age as a covariate.  The test of ANCOVA 
assumptions showed a significant group (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week 
condition) x pretest interaction (F (2,45) = 10.99, p < .001); however, no group x age 
interaction was observed, meaning the pretest cannot be used as a covariate but age can.  
The change in score from pretest to posttest by group was therefore tested with a two- 
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way repeated-measures ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition; 
treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (total empathy score at pretest and 
posttest) with age as covariate.  The test revealed no significant main effect for time of 
measure or group x time of measure interaction.  
 IRI Empathic Concern (EC) score.  The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) x pretest 
interaction (F (2,45) = 10.99, p < .001), but no group x age interaction.  A two-way, 
repeated-measure ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition; 
treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (EC score at pretest and posttest) was 
therefore conducted with age as covariate.  The results indicate no significant main effect 
for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction when controlling for age. 
 IRI Perspective Taking (PT) score.  The test of ANCOVA assumptions indicated 
that all had been met.  However, in this case a two-way, repeated-measures ANCOVA 
with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) and 
one within factor (PT score at pretest and posttest) and age as a covariate was preferred 
because using just the one covariate in a mixed design provides more statistical power 
than a design with two covariates.   Results indicate no main effect for time of measure 
but demonstrate a trend toward a significant group x time of measure interaction (F 
(1,47) = 3.04, p < .10).  The trend is toward a greater gain in PT scores in the 9-week 
condition treatment group pretest to posttest compared to the 3-week condition treatment 
group (see Table 3 for means). 
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Table 3  
Mean Pretest and Mean and Adjusted Mean Posttest Scores on  Perspective Taking . 
             Posttest   
    Pretest    Obtained          Adjusted  
Condition  n M SD  M SD  M  
 
3-week  treatment 38 13.50 2.89  11.86 3.58  12.57 
3-week  control 28 13.93 4.77  13.46 3.45  13.81 
9-week treatment 12 12.50 4.33  13.58 4.52  12.76 
9-week control 13 13.38 4.07  13.61 5.81  13.25 
 
 IRI Fantasy Scale (FS) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment 3-week condition; treatment 9-week condition) x pretest 
interaction (F (2,45) = 3.50, p < .05), but no group x age interaction.  A two-way, 
repeated-measures ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week; treatment, 9-
week) and one within factor (FS score at pretest and posttest) was therefore conducted 
with age as a covariate.  The results indicate no significant main effect for time of 
measure or group x time of measure interaction when controlling for age.  
 Concern for Others Scale (COS).  The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a 
significant group (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) x pretest 
interaction (F (2,44) = 11.08, p < .001), but no group x age interaction. A two-way, 
repeated-measures ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition;  
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treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (score at pretest and posttest) was 
therefore conducted with age as covariate.  The results indicate no significant main effect 
for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction when controlling for age. 
 MTI Comprehensive Score.  Not all students completed the entire battery, but, as 
indicated above, all106 study subjects completed the MTI. The treatment groups from the 
two counties that completed both the pre- and posttest of the MTI showed no significant 
differences in reading comprehension score or age, allowing the consideration of an 
ANCOVA analysis without age as a covariate.  Given the dependence of the MTI on 
reading, Narvaez et al., (1999) suggest that the reading comprehension score as well as 
the pretest MTI comprehensive score be used as covariates in the analysis.  The test of 
ANCOVA assumptions results in a significant group x reading comprehension score 
interaction precluding the use of that variable as a covariate (F (2,54) = 3.56, p < .05).  
However, there is no group x pre-MTI comprehensive score interaction and the pre-MTI 
comprehensive score and the reading comprehension score significantly correlate (r = 
.271, p < .05).  Therefore, we can get a meaningful analysis by using just the pre-MTI 
comprehensive score as a covariate.  Thus, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted with the 
MTI comprehensive score at posttest as the dependent variable, the pre-MTI 
comprehensive score as covariate and the two treatment groups (3-week condition, 9-
week condition) as fixed factors.  Results indicate a significant difference in the group 
means in the treatment conditions of the two counties (F(1, 56) = 5.75, p < .05;  partial 
eta2 = .093;  power = .654;  R2 = .155).  This means that the longer treatment condition 
(9-week) had a greater impact than the shorter, more intense treatment (3-week) on the  
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posttest comprehensive score of the MTI when controlled for the pretest MTI 
comprehensive score. (See Table 4 for means).  
Table 4 
Mean Pretest and Mean and Adjusted Mean Posttest Scores on the MTI Comprehensive. 
              Posttest   
    Pretest        Obtained              Adjusted  
Condition  n M SD   M SD  M  
 
3-week treatment 46 6.72 9.99   4.93 9.82  5.14 
3-week control 46 2.82 9.95   3.84 10.91  4.93 
9-week treatment 13 11.08 15.45   14.00 14.02  13.27 
9-week control 13 9.31 15.34   19.72 14.66  17.60 
  
 The Moral Stage Attraction Score.   Because the focus of the analysis for Moral 
Stage Attraction is the change in the rating each individual subject gives to the Stage 1-3 
distractor statements from pretest to posttest and the effect that group membership has on 
that change, a repeated-measures, two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, 
3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (the Total Moral 
Stage Attraction score at pretest and posttest) was conducted.  There is no significant 
main effect for time of measure but there is a significant group x time of measure 
interaction (F (1,57) = 9.79, p < .01;  partial eta2 = .147, observed power = .868).  The 
group means show an increase in the 3-week condition treatment group in Moral Stage  
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Attraction over time, while the 9-week condition treatment group showed a decrease (see 
Table 2).  This is consistent with expectations, and consistent with the above finding in 
which the 9-week condition treatment group made greater gains than the 3-week 
condition treatment group on the comprehensive MTI score from pretest to posttest.  
Since the Moral Stage Attraction score represents errors in the standard MTI scoring 
scheme, the Moral Stage Attraction Score may be inversely related to the MTI score.     
 In summary, when comparing the 3-week, intense treatment condition with the 9-
week, extended treatment condition, the longer treatment proved more effective, 
especially as measured by the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI) task.  Although the test did 
not reach significance, there is a trend in the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI that 
favors the longer 9-week condition treatment group as well.  When examining the 
attraction of the participants to higher stage reasoning from pre- to posttest, by taking a 
closer look at the ratings participants gave to Stage 1-3 distractor statements in the MTI, 
the opposite trend is found.  The 3-week condition treatment group participants gave 
significantly higher ratings to Stage 1, 2, and 3 distractor statements at posttest than at 
pretest compared to their 9-week condition counterparts. 
 Summarizing all the results, the within-condition comparisons between treatment 
and control groups show no significant effect of the treatment on Moral Theme 
Comprehension, Total Empathy, Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking or Fantasy, or on 
the measure of Concern for Others in either county.  However, the shorter, 3-week 
treatment condition initiated an attraction to higher stage moral reasoning statements in  
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the treatment group, since the Moral Stage Attraction scores were significantly higher in 
that group compared to the control.  
 The post-hoc between-county comparison of the treatment groups yielded 
significant differences in the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI) Comprehensive Score, with 
the 9-week condition proving more effective than the shorter 3-week condition.  No 
significant differences were found in the other measures between treatment groups but 
there was a trend in Perspective Taking that favored the 9-week condition treatment 
group.  An analysis of Moral Stage Attraction score differences revealed that the shorter 
3-week treatment condition produced a greater attraction to statements of higher staged 
reasoning at posttest than was evident at pretest, compared to the 9-week condition.  
Since the Moral Stage Attraction score represents errors in the standard MTI scoring 
scheme, we see in both treatment groups an inverse relationship between the Moral Stage 
Attraction Score and the MTI score.  
Discussion 
 This study evaluating the effectiveness of the Film Clips for Character Education 
curriculum demonstrates that the program has potential for affecting moral reasoning and 
perspective taking, but that potential was not realized in this study.  Summarizing the 
results, the within-condition comparisons of treatment and control groups show no 
significant effect of the treatment on Moral Theme Comprehension (MTI), Total 
Empathy, Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking, Fantasy (IRI), or on the measure of 
Concern for Others (COS) in either county.  The only statistically significant difference 
in the between group comparisons (treatment vs. control) in either condition was found in  
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the Moral Stage Attraction scores in the 3-week condition.  The treatment group showed 
significantly more attraction to higher stage moral reasoning distractors at posttest than 
did the control. 
Primary Question for Discussion 
 The primary question for discussion is: given the theoretical potential of the 
curriculum and the support for the techniques found in the literature, why were there no 
significant gains in the measures from pre- to posttest in either treatment group compared 
to their controls?  The discussion will focus on three possible answers: (a) the 
implementation of the curriculum was not adequate, (b) the measures did not pick up the 
changes the curriculum afforded, and (c) the attrition of the original sample adversely 
affected the ability to record significant gains in the treatment group.  
 Implementation.  Of the eight strategies commonly employed in successful 
character education programs, four involve teacher training or teaching strategies  
(professional development, interactive teaching strategies, direct teaching strategies, 
classroom/behavior management; the remaining are: family/community participation, 
modeling/mentoring ,school-wide strategies, and community service/service learning, 
Berkowitz & Bier, 2005).  This finding points to the importance of consistent and 
sustained teacher training in the form of professional development and implementation 
strategies.  The teacher training for the Film Clips curriculum was brief (2 hours) and not 
all the teachers received the same training.  I trained 5 of the 7 teachers (and one 
supervisor) in two separate training sessions.  In those sessions the emphasis was 
acquainting the teachers with the logistics of the curriculum.  Little time was spent on  
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training how to lead dilemma discussions or how to get participants to talk to one 
another.  It was clear from the informal reports of the teachers that the discussion portion 
was a form of a teacher-led question and answer session (the students responding to 
teacher-initiated questions).  Training teachers in more effective discussion techniques 
that are proven to develop moral reasoning such as promoting greater student to student 
dialogue (Kruger, 1992) and/or a plus-one strategy (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975) would 
increase the chances of the curriculum positively affecting the outcome measures.  
 The difference in the length of treatment between the two counties (3-week vs. 9-
week) allowed me to test which length of treatment yielded better results.  The between-
county comparison of the treatment groups yielded significant differences in the Moral 
Theme Inventory (MTI) comprehensive posttest score, with the 9-week condition proving 
more effective than the shorter 3-week condition after controlling for the pretest score 
(and, by extension, controlling for reading comprehension, since the pretest MTI score 
significantly correlated with reading comprehension).  No significant differences were 
found in the other measures between treatment groups but there was a trend toward a 
difference in the IRI Perspective Taking score that favored the longer 9-week condition 
treatment group.  A Moral Stage Attraction (MSA) analysis revealed that the shorter 3-
week treatment condition produced a greater attraction to distractors of higher stages of 
reasoning at posttest than was evident at pretest, compared to the 9-week treatment 
condition.  Since distractors represent wrong answers on the MTI, there is an inverse 
relationship between the MSA and the MTI. 
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 The 9-week condition teachers may have benefited from better training.  In the 9-
week condition, both teachers were trained by the experimenter while only 5 of 7 
teachers in the 3-week condition received direct training.  The 9-week teachers received 
direct instructions from the experimenter on how to conduct the testing as well.  The 3-
week teachers were trained in testing procedures by their supervisor.  The testing 
procedures were not monitored in either county, so there is no way to know if the tapes 
that contained the stories and questions of the MTI were used properly or consistently.  
There was also no provision for monitoring the implementation of the curriculum as it 
proceeded.  Although I obtained some knowledge of the implementation of the 
curriculum through a post-hoc interview with some of the teachers, the study would have 
benefited from more consistent monitoring of the presentation of the curriculum, the 
conduct of the discussion portion and the testing of the participants. 
 On the positive side, it is sensible to speculate that the gains by the participants in 
the longer treatment condition were the result of more time to practice making moral 
inferences in their regular school experience, having learned from the Film Clips 
curriculum to look for the moral lesson in life situations and to practice good character 
traits.  However, the practical significance of the finding that the 9-week condition is 
more effective than the 3-week condition as measured by the MTI is tempered by the fact 
that the effect size of the comparison is minimal (eta2 = .093).  It must also be kept in 
mind that the 3-week group was from a sample of low-achievers who were required to 
attend summer school because they did not pass the test promoting them to the next 
grade.  In that sense a comparison of the length of program (9-week/3-week) is also a  
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comparison of average achievers and low achievers.  Again, stressing the positive, the 
gains in Moral Stage Attraction by the participants in the 3-week condition compared to 
the 3-week control could be the result of intense exposure to higher stage reasoning in the 
discussion of the film clips and the dilemmas they present. 
 Measures.   The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) has been used 
before in program evaluation with late grade school-aged children (Lane-Garon,1998) as 
well as the Concern for Others Scale (Solomon et al., 2000).  The dearth of results with 
these measures are best explained by deficits in the curriculum or in its implementation. 
However, this is the first time that the Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al., 1998) has 
been used in a pretest-intervention-posttest design.  The measure was designed to show 
that learning morals and good character from a story was highly dependent on the 
reader’s ability to discern moral themes in a story and that this ability was age dependant 
(increasing with age, Narvaez et al., 1998).  The measure is also highly dependent not 
only on reading comprehension skills, but the more sophisticated skill of making correct 
inferences from stories.  In addition, the ability to catch the moral theme of a story is 
tested twice, first by recognizing a similar story with the same moral but different 
characters and setting and then by recognizing two correct summary statements of the 
story in the midst of five distractor statements.  While the curriculum trained the 
participants to recognize moral themes in the life situations depicted in the films, those 
skills may or may not have translated into better recognition of correct moral themes in 
moral stories.  
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 The testing of gains in moral reasoning are best measured by the ratings and 
choices of the restatements of the moral theme of the story.  Moreover, as the Moral 
Stage Attraction analysis demonstrates, those participants who were attracted to higher 
stage reasoning at posttest compared to pretest, yet did not discern the correct restatement 
of the moral theme, were actually penalized for a growing attraction to higher stage 
statements of the moral of the story (the only restatements of the moral of the story 
explicitly based on Kohlberg’s moral reasoning stages are statements that contain 
reasoning at stages one through three).  Therefore, it can be averred that the MTI 
comprehensive score was not sensitive enough to catch these subtle changes in attraction 
to higher stages of moral reasoning.  In future studies, the use of a measure explicitly 
designed to measure changes and growth in moral reasoning may be a better tool in 
evaluating the effectiveness of this curriculum than was the MTI. 
 Attrition.  There is little doubt that the findings would have been more conclusive 
with a larger sample.  The loss of over 75 percent of the original sample at posttest made 
the study more complicated and less definitive.  The random nature of the sample was 
lost which necessitated controlling for age and reading ability and weakening the power 
of the statistical testing.   Besides the significant differences in age and reading ability 
between the two counties, the different lengths of treatment meant that the treatment 
groups could not be combined which would have also aided in the statistical analysis.  
The gains in a brief intervention would be expected to be small and the numbers of 
participants in the 9-week condition are simply too small to detect any small gains in the 
measures.   The participants in the 3-week condition did show some movement in  
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attraction to statements based on higher stages of moral reasoning at posttest, but the 
effect size is small (eta2 = .068).  The setting of an after-school program is notoriously 
difficult for researchers due to these very problems.  The after-school population may not 
adequately represent the larger population and the after-school programs suffer from 
attrition. Testing this curriculum in a more stable classroom setting will certainly benefit 
its evaluation.   
 The one positive and significant result was that the 3-week treatment group 
showed attraction to restatements of the moral of the story based on higher stages of 
moral reasoning in the MTI at posttest than they had demonstrated at pretest compared to 
their control counterparts.  This study represents the first time the Moral Stage Attraction 
analysis has been conducted with the MTI.  It is based on the idea that the participants 
might recognizing higher stage statements as a more adequate restatement of the moral 
theme of the story at posttest than they had at pretest (as is the case with the 3-week 
treatment group compared to their control counterparts).  Rest et al. (1999a, 1999b) argue 
the validity of recognition as a way of measuring moral stage reasoning.  We can 
speculate that the attraction to the various distractor statements in the MTI would also 
reflect the stage or schema that predominates the subject’s moral reasoning. Tracking the 
ratings of the distractors from pre- to posttest gives an indication whether or not the 
moral schema out of which the test subject is in the habit of operating has advanced.  Rest 
et al. (1999b) indicate that transition in moral reasoning in children is not like moving up 
the step of a staircase, but more like waves lapping up on the shore as the tide comes in.  
Each wave makes more and more progress forward until a higher level is reached.  The 3- 
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week condition treatment group, by their attraction to higher staged distractor sentences 
at posttest compared to pretest, showed progress into higher stages of moral reasoning 
(the first “wave,” if you will) without having achieved a consolidation into those higher 
stages.  Thus one result we might claim from the effect of the curriculum might be that it 
initiated an attraction to statements reflecting higher stages of moral reasoning, which 
could be the beginning of a change in preference to think about moral decisions at higher 
levels of moral reasoning.   The 9-week treatment group did not show similar signs as the 
3-week treatment group perhaps because the small numbers of participants in that 
condition precluded any significant statistical discoveries.  
 Despite the limitations outlined above, this study contributes to the existing 
research on moral development and effective character education on several fronts.  It is 
the first scientific test of the effectiveness of a new technique for training the critical skill 
of perspective taking for moral reasoning and prosocial action using film clips from 
Hollywood-produced films.  Hollywood films are structured to engage our perceptual 
systems as if we were viewing reality (Anderson, 1996) and viewing the film clips allows 
for a veridical experience of moral conflict situations.  The Film Clips curriculum affords 
a chance to teach participants how to reason in moral conflict situations as well as 
provides occasion for the discussion of proper moral conduct.  Results from a post-hoc 
analysis suggest that those exposed to the curriculum over a longer period of time were 
more practiced and therefore better able to recognize moral themes and less distracted by 
lower level moral reasoning than those who had less exposure to the curriculum (Lapsley 
& Narvaez, in press). This study uses the Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al. 1999)  
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for the first time to evaluate a program in a pretest – treatment – posttest design. 
Moreover, the study employs a new type of analysis of the MTI, the Moral Stage 
Attraction, which affords a closer look at the subtle changes in attraction to statements 
that reflect higher stages of moral reasoning that is age-appropriate to grade school 
children.  The participants in the shorter, 3-week condition evidenced an attraction to 
higher stage moral reasoning at posttest then they had at pretest.  
 Because the theoretical potential of the Film Clips curriculum was not realized in 
this study does not mean it cannot work well as a vehicle for delivering character 
education content and for affecting growth in moral development.  The salience of the 
emotional experience of viewing a film, coupled with the cognitive processing of those 
empathic emotions in group discussion, which mimics the induction technique of parents 
when raising moral children, affords a critical opportunity for both the inculcation of 
proper character traits and for acquiring the critical skills for a moral disposition.  In this 
way the goals of traditional character education and rational moral education can be met.   
 This study shows the potential for such a blended approach to “work” in our 
schools and other learning centers.  To realize this potential, the implementation of the 
curriculum should be more closely monitored. Better training of the teachers, especially 
in techniques proven to enhance the development of moral reasoning would enhance the 
effectiveness of the curriculum.  Conducting the curriculum in a regular classroom setting 
where attrition is not as large an issue as in after-school programs along with closely 
gauging the ongoing implementation of the curriculum by regular classroom visits and 
repeated teacher interviews would allow for a more controlled dose of the treatment and  
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afford a stricter analysis of its effectiveness.  Finally, testing the curriculum with 
measures that can record significant changes in perspective taking, moral reasoning and 
prosocial behavior would secure the validity of potential findings. 
 In conclusion, the theoretical basis of this curriculum is sound.  The response of 
the teachers who conducted the curriculum and their assessment of the student’s reaction 
is wholly positive.  Never-the-less, enthusiasm and theoretical potential do not a 
successful curriculum make.  The most salient conclusion of this study is:  
implementation of even the finest curriculum matters.  Further research on this 
curriculum with proper implementation and controls will contribute to the ongoing 
attempts to create effective moral development and character education curricula.  
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Figure 1. Differences Between Groups 
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Figure 2. Changes in MTI scores 
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Figure 3. Changes in Moral Stage Attraction scores 
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